

SKETCH

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
NATURAL LAWS OF MAN,

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
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P R E F A C E.

MEN have long been treated as children ; they have been taught that ignorance and credulity are virtues, and that fear is wisdom ; and that they may glorify God by flattery rather than by moral excellency. Arbitrary regulations of all sorts have been imposed upon them, and blind and unconditional obedience to these required. Words too often satisfy them ; and the less they understand, the more do they generally deem it incumbent on them to admire ; sensual gratifications have proved sufficient inducements for them willingly to follow the good pleasure of their masters. Even religion, in one or another form, has been an engine to crush the human mind. This was, at all times, more or less the deplorable condition of mankind. Those who even in our days make exception, are comparatively few in number.

The following pages are written with a view to ascertain whether or not the human kind be susceptible of better treatment ; and whether or not the arbitrary legislation of man, that has hitherto been, and must always be, but temporary, and of limited application, might not advantageously give place to a code of IMMUTABLE LAWS, which, established by the Creator, and not adapted to a single family, to a particular nation, to an age, but to all mankind, and to all times, are calculated to endure as long as the species remains.

It is of the highest importance to demonstrate the existence of such laws, although it may happen that governments and nations will oppose their adoption. But this opposition will not annihilate the reality of the NATURAL CODE.

and communities will certainly feel disposed to receive, will even demand it, in proportion as they become enlightened ; they will also be worthy of it in proportion as they become virtuous.

I shall consider my subject under the form of question and answer, the better to fix the attention of my reader. My sole intention is to contribute to the amelioration of man ; that is to say, to combat his ignorance and his immorality, and to point out the means of making him better and happier, by insisting particularly on the necessity of his fulfilling the laws of his Creator.

Some may be of opinion that I might here have avoided the introduction of any question upon religion and morality. I, however, think it incumbent on a philosopher to examine all that enters into the nature of man, and to '*hold fast that which is good.*' Now man being positively endowed with moral and religious feelings, as well as with vegetative functions and intellectual faculties, it was my business to speak of the former as well as of the latter. Nay, true religion is central truth ; and all knowledge, in my opinion, should be gathered round it.

I lament the continual war which philosophers, moralists, and divines, have hitherto waged. They have only mutually disparaged their inquiries, and retarded the knowledge and happiness of man. Would they consent to lay aside vanity, pride, and self-interest, they would perceive, and might display, the harmony that exists between the will of God and his gift of intelligence.



SKETCH

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NATURAL LAWS OF MAN.

GENERALITIES.

What is the meaning of the word Philosopher? It signifies Lover of Wisdom.

And what is understood by Wisdom? Wisdom consists in the knowledge and in the application of Truth.

Who then is truly a philosopher? He who not only loves, but who applies truth universally. The second part is as essential to the character of a philosopher, as is the practice of morality to that of a christian.

What is the aim of philosophy? To know objects and phenomena, and to show the possibility of making practical application of the knowledge acquired.

Then there must be many kinds of philosophers? As many as there are species of knowledge, or subjects that can occupy the attention.—One may be a philosopher, and study entire nature, or a particular district of her domain; as animals, plants, minerals, man generally, or his physical, moral, and intellectual parts in particular.

What is understood by a Law? The word law, among the Romans *lex*, has the same root as the verb signifying, to read; because enactments for the conduct of the community were promulgated of old by being read in public. For a long period, however, the word law has been used to designate a commandment to do, or to abstain from, some specific act, in general combined with a clause expressive of some penalty attached to its infringement, and more rarely of some reward to its observance. The word law is also employed to designate the inherent qualities of the objects, and the determinate manner in which the human faculties, and the qualities of organised and inanimate bodies, act. That is to say, beings can only act after their peculiar natures, or according to the qualities and powers with which they are endowed. It is a law, that a stone thrown into the air falls again till it reaches the ground; that the stomach digests; that the eye is the instrument of vision, the ear of hearing, &c. Further, the title law is applied to the regularity with which bodies and animated beings act upon each other, and produce

certain phenomena. It is a law, that caloric united with water changes it into vapour, that fire consumes combustible bodies, that poisons destroy life; and so on, through the whole circle of natural phenomena.

How may laws be divided? They may be classed under two heads—the Natural, and the Artificial. The first are imposed by the Creator, the second by individual governors.

What is the signification of the word nature? Nature is a word to which three distinct meanings are attached:—1st, It designates the universe,—the heavens, the earth, all that meets sense: 2nd, It expresses essence—that which characterizes or constitutes a class of beings, or individuality. In this sense we say—every being acts according to its nature; man in his nature is not an angel; we cannot change the nature of things; we cannot, for example, gather figs off thistles, nor grapes off thorns. 3rd. It is used to signify the First Cause personified, and may then be considered as synonymous with God, or Creator.

What are the characteristics of natural laws, or of laws established by the Creator? Natural laws are inherent in beings, often evident, always demonstrable, universal, invariable, and harmonious.

How is the first character of natural laws, their inherence, explained? The laws of nature exist by creation, and enter as a part into the constitution of beings. The bile is secreted by the liver according to a natural law, and cannot be produced by the stomach for a similar reason. The stomach digests some substances by a natural law, and by the same cause does not digest others. Light exists in conformity with certain laws, and we cannot see that as great which is little, nor that as little which is great. The inherence of natural laws is therefore apparent.

How is the second characteristic of natural laws, their regularity, to be apprehended? The regularity of phenomena is so generally evident as scarcely to require demonstration. Every one knows that without support his body falls, that his hand brought too near the fire is burned, that there is no vision without

light, and so on. Occasionally, however, the natural laws are less apparent; still they may always be discovered by observation. The mechanician searches for, and finds, the laws of his art; the musician those of music; the colourist those of colour; the landscape painter those of perspective, &c. A great number of natural laws are at present unknown, but they will be detected as soon as truth is placed above every other consideration—as soon as the free employment of the understanding is allowed, and men have learned to combine all the characters of a natural law.

How does the universality of natural laws appear? They are the same in every country. Chemistry has no other laws in France than it has in England, or in any other part of the earth; carbonic acid gas kills men in the north and in the south, in the east and in the west; combinations of colour unharmonious in any one country, will not please the eye viewed by the sun of any other; the same laws pervade the music of every nation, of the English, French, Italians, Germans, &c.

How are the natural laws invariable? They have been the same in all ages. The principle of the lever, at the present time, is precisely the same as it was when the Pharaohs and Ptolemies lived; the rules of geometry and arithmetic have suffered no change since they were applied by Euclid and Archimedes; the beautiful forms of the Grecian marbles are still beautiful; goodness since the beginning has not ceased to be beneficent, and so on. Our knowledge may be more or less extensive, more or less exact, but the laws themselves never vary.

How are the natural laws harmonious? The Creator has contrived all things as parts of a grand whole, and combined all his enactments in perfect harmoniousness. Natural laws are, consequently, mutually aidant. It is ignorance alone that prompts us occasionally to fancy discrepancies among them. The laws of vegetation act in accordance with those of animalization. The fruits and substance of plants yield food to innumerable tribes of animals, and the excretions and the dead bodies of animals in return afford aliment to the infinite variety of vegetables that adorn the earth. The principle, that nothing is useless, is true physically, as it is morally. Hence it follows, that philosophy is to seek for, determine, and expose the harmony of the natural code.

Are all inanimate and all living beings subject to natural laws? All beings whatsoever have a determinate nature; all phenomena appear in conformity with fixed and invariable laws. Any opinion to the contrary is fraught with danger to mankind.

But do not we degrade the being—man, for instance—whose nature we pronounce to be determinate? Most certainly we do not. The nature of the Supreme Being himself is deter-

minate; he, for instance, cannot desire evil for his nature is perfection. Now we can, more readily conceive beings he made and endowed according to his pleasure possessed of a determinate nature. Without this indeed, there would be no regularity in their functions.

As the natural laws are no where to be found reduced to writing, how can we be certain of having discovered them? Observation and induction will lead securely to their knowledge. We shall recognise them certainly when they possess all the distinguishing characters.

Are the natural laws conformable to reason? They must necessarily be so. They produce certain never-varying effects; whatever is undertaken in conformity with their decrees prospers, and penalty is always in proportion to their infringement.

Must not natural laws also be divine? As they exist, they are evidently effects of the will of the Creator, or God.

Is there any cause to apprehend, from the doctrine of the natural laws, the introduction of such evils as attended on the systems of government called Theocracies? The self-elected and presumed interpreters of a revelation have always had much better opportunities of acting arbitrarily, and of enforcing belief, than can fall to the lot of the proposers of natural laws. The priesthood has generally taught dogmatically, and interdicted the use of reason. Natural law, on the contrary, is submitted to the free scrutiny of all, and is appreciated in great part by means of reason: every one, so inclining, may, under the guidance of observation, be convinced of the reality of its several propositions. There is nothing but good to be anticipated from the study of the natural law.

Have not the made and artificial laws of men the distinguishing features of those which are natural? Enacted by beings who may err themselves, or who, from various motives, may wish to deceive and to lead others into error, they are often founded on caprice, and on partial considerations; they are frequently modified by local and individual circumstances; they vary in every nation, and have changed with the different epochs in the history of each. Such a law would not have been instituted, had not such a man lived or such an event happened. The act which the arbitrary law of one country approves, is often condemned by the made code of another. It has even happened, that laws simultaneously imposed have been mutually subversive. They are frequently repugnant to good sense, and they have also been unjust; for they have conferred immunities and privileges on individuals, have attached rewards and punishments by no means commensurate to the extent of virtuous conduct, or the magnitude of criminal actions, and have ranked as virtues and as vices actions altogether insignificant or purely indifferent.

Can society neglect positive laws—that is to

say, rules of conduct which, clearly announced, are binding on all its members? No; there are few who may be left to themselves, to their good pleasure, to their inclinations and their judgments. The majority of mankind requires positive laws for its direction, and frequent admonition as to what is to be done and what left alone.

Wherefore is this? Because of the generally deficient strength of the sentiments which dictate the *Moral Law*, and the true rule of conduct in the world.

Admitting the necessity of a positive code then, is there any essential difference between natural and positive laws? There ought to be none. The natural laws should be promulgated as positive and obligatory on all. Unfortunately, this is not done. The positive laws of society are even too frequently the very opposite of those which the Creator dictates.

How may the artificial laws be subdivided? Into arbitrary or absolute, and into conventional. The former are the result of the good pleasure of the ruler, the others are fixed upon by the agreement of several legislators.

What titles are given to the transgression of any law whatever? As regards religion, *Sin*, and as concerns civil enactments, *Crime*. These are the most comprehensive terms in use.

Do transgressions of the law, or sins and crimes, admit of degrees of gravity? That they do is a point admitted by all legislators, civil as well as religious.

What title is given to the consequence of the infringement of a law? Evil.

Are there many and various kinds of evil? Evil is first physical, or it is moral; then it is individual, or general; lastly, it is temporal, or eternal.

Are not these different kinds of evil linked together and inseparable? Physical and moral evil engender each other mutually. Individuals and society are connected and in relation; and, according to the christian religion, our fate through eternity depends on the present life.

Does it ever happen that man suffers innocently; that is to say, for the transgression of a law in ignorance of its existence? It occurs frequently, and in reference to the whole of the three kinds of natural laws. The punishments, too, are always as severe as if merited by wilful neglect. Belladonna kills him who knows not, as well as him who knows, its poisonous quality, the man of genius and the fool, the pious and the impious. All suffer alike who infringe, as all without exception prosper who obey, the natural laws.

Is the study of man a study of great importance? What of so much? Man is at the head of the terrestrial creation. He alone examines the causes of natural phenomena and imitates many of them. He alone elevates his

thoughts to the conception of a first cause, and is susceptible of moral and religious ideas.

What is the great object of the philosophy of man? To determine accurately the fundamental powers of the human mind, and to ascertain the conditions under which these are exhibited; to indicate the causes of the functions variously modified in individuals; and to show the necessity of man's as well as of every other created being's submission to the laws which the Creator imposes to enjoy happiness and to secure success in his undertakings.

Is the agency of the natural law suspended, because of man's living in society? By no means. Man was destined to live in society, and obedience to one natural ordination cannot render another ineffective. The Creator has laid down certain laws for man's social state, adherence to which is indispensable to his happiness, under whatever circumstances he may chance to be placed.

Is mankind happy? To whatever side we turn our eyes, the unfortunate, and miserable, and discontented meet our view. There are very few indeed who are happy.

Wherein consists the happiness of man? In the satisfaction of his faculties.

Does the happiness of men differ; or, is that which gratifies one, calculated to be agreeable to all? Happiness differs universally according to individual constitution. There are as many distinct species of happiness and pleasure, as there are fundamental faculties; and men being unlike in mental endowment, the cause of happiness in one case is frequently a source of disgust in a second, and is unnoticed as either in a third.

We cannot, therefore, find any measure of the happiness of others, in taking ourselves as standards? Certainly we cannot; because the faculties are not equally nor alike active in all men.

In what does the misery of man consist? In the non-satisfaction of his faculties.

Then the causes of the misery of man are different, are they not? They vary according to the faculty or faculties which are active, and which are not satisfied.

What is the principal cause of the unhappiness of man? Ignorance and transgression of the natural law.

It appears, therefore, that to know and to practise the natural law is extremely important? As evil consists in its transgression, and good in its accomplishment, and as its infringement is the principal cause of man's unhappiness, the natural law ought to be made a principal study with every individual; it should be learned by heart, and its precepts never lost sight of in the business of life.

How may the natural laws of man be subdivided? Into three kinds, after the threefold nature of his functions, viz., Vegetative, Intellectual, and Moral.

Do these three kinds of laws exert a mutual influence? They do, and it is of much importance not to confound the fundamental faculties in which they inhere, with the products of the mutual influence of those faculties, nor the existence of three kinds of laws with their reciprocal relations.

SECTION I.

OF THE VEGETATIVE LAWS OF MAN.

What natural laws of man are Vegetative? Those which concern the preservation of his body are so entitled.

How may these laws be divided? Into two orders, having for their objects respectively, 1st, The preservation of the individual; 2nd, The preservation of the species.

What are the most important of the natural laws that relate to the preservation of individuals? 1st, a good innate constitution, and, 2nd, the laws of dietetics, which include temperature, light, air, food, cleanliness, exercise, and repose.

Is not a perfect attention to the laws of dietetics indispensable to health? Yes; a certain quantity of caloric is necessary to life, but it injures the bodily health in too great abundance or too great scarcity. Cold engenders many complaints, not only among the poor, but also among the rich. The impossibility of guarding against sudden changes of temperature, and the imprudence with which all expose themselves to these, are causes of innumerable diseases. The quality of the air man breathes also influences his bodily state. Carbonic acid gas suppresses the vital functions, hydrogen retards, and oxygen accelerates them; marsh miasmata produce diseases, &c. Air free from all putrid or other exhalations is necessary to enable man to exercise his various attributes with energy.

How may the dietetic laws that relate to Alimentation be considered? Either as the quantity or the quality of alimentary matter is concerned.

Does the quality of man's food deserve attention? It should be accommodated to age, temperament, climate, and season; and should vary with the prevailing weather, and the state of health of the individual. Whatever is easily digested is wholesome, whatever is not is pernicious. Many enactments of ancient legislators show their sense of the propriety of regulating the quality of aliment. Religious lawgivers seem also to have had the same end in view, when they pronounced certain kinds of food to be clean, and certain others to be unclean. Pork in the warm countries of the East is unwholesome, and the Jews and Mahometans are forbidden by a religious commandment to eat of it.

Does the general law in regard to the salubrity of aliments vary in different countries? In every climate the general law is the same:

such food is universally to be used as may be digested with ease. But aliment varies in kind in every different country; and as food, by another natural law, must always harmonise with the particular circumstances of existence, with age, temperament, climate, &c., such things cannot be proper, in lands where the excessive heat and light of the sun stimulate the vital functions greatly, as are wholesome and even necessary in regions where fogs and frost and darkness cramp the energies of man.

There is nothing then clean or unclean in itself? Nothing. Every thing, however, may deserve either title by its employment in general or in particular cases.

Are the dietetic rules of the Jews of Palestine, and of the Egyptians, adapted to the nations of the north? By no means. To prescribe the same course of diet to the inhabitants of every country of the globe, would not be less absurd than to command the same material, and the same form, for the garments of the Esquimaux, European, and native of Senegal.

How is the natural law, having reference to quantity of food, entitled? Sobriety or Temperance.

Is this law of much importance? It exerts a powerful influence upon the well-being of individuals. The sober man digests easily, his body is properly nourished, and he is ever in a condition to attend to his affairs.

What crimes are committed against Sobriety? Gluttony and Drunkenness.

What evils attend on the first of these? A long train of ills wait upon gluttony. It injures the health, and weakens the digestive powers; or it brings on obesity, unfits the body for its duties, obscures the powers of the mind, and occasions every species of inconvenience.

What evils accompany the second crime against Sobriety? The consequences which attend drunkenness are nearly similar, but greater in degree. Drunkenness undermines the health, enfeebles digestion, and reduces its unhappy votary to the level of the brutes; it deprives him of the distinctions of humanity, which his Creator had given for his guidance, rendering him equally unfit for business and unworthy of trust; and making him quarrelsome and unreasonable, it fills his home with misery and disorder.

What is the natural law which forbids the abuse of solid or liquid aliment? It is the law of Abstinence.

Does this law absolutely forbid all food whatever for a season, or certain kinds of food, as wine, entirely? It does no more than interdict those things that are noxious, and the abuse of those which are good and proper. But this simple and salutary interpretation has been abandoned; sound views and excellent laws have been misunderstood, and changed into superstitious observances—the original aim of their institution has indeed been very generally

lost sight of altogether. To subdue their animal appetites, the inhabitants of Roman Catholic countries are commanded to eat no flesh on certain days of the week, but they may still drink wine, live upon fish, with rich and stimulating sauces, on eggs, lobsters, and various shell-fish. Now sensualism is in fact more excited by such aliments than by the flesh of animals plainly dressed. The Mahometans are forbidden to drink wine, but they still may intoxicate themselves by the unrestrained use of coffee, opium, and tobacco; during the Rhamadan, they are commanded to touch neither solid nor liquid food from sunrise to sunset, by a restriction which, however, allows them to revel in debauchery from sunset to sunrise, &c.

Are certain days indicated by the natural law as proper to be observed as fasts? Sobriety and the law of Abstinence, are never to be interrupted in their agency, never to be departed from. No specific day, or number of days, are pointed out by the natural law as especial Fasts. We must ever eat and drink that we may live, not live that we may eat and drink. The laws of hunger and thirst exist; and he who obeys not their calls in due season and at fitting time, is as much guilty of a breach of the divine will, as he who abuses them by brutal indulgence.

Does it not follow from this, that the laws of sobriety, and abstinence or fasting, are to be enforced, not to please the Creator, but purely to advantage man? The first interpretation is the effect of ignorance, and is repugnant to good sense. These natural laws have no other end but the happiness of individuals, and of the kind at large, and as they exert a powerful influence over the health, the habitual dispositions, and the momentary affections of the mind, they ought to be taught and made universally known. Man, it is evident, feels his bodily as well as his mental state to vary during a fast, and after a hearty meal. A cup of strong coffee, or a glass of generous wine, gives more or less activity both to the body and to the mind. Aliment is the principal cause of the organic constitution, on which depends the degree of energy possessed by the fundamental faculties of the body and mind. Without a body and a brain, there is no exhibition of vegetative or mental phenomena in this world; without food there can be neither body nor brain.—Hence the importance of the natural laws of alimentation.

Was the importance of the law of Sobriety known to the ancients? The rules of dietetics among them constituted a great part of moral science, and of the revealed commandments. This proves sufficiently the attention they bestowed on them, and the degree of importance they attached to their observance.

Are not the laws of bodily exercise also to be carefully observed? Bodily exercise is useful at every period of life; it is, however, more

especially so during youth, and the years of corporeal development.

Has attention to the law of cleanliness any influence on individuals? Cleanliness, as it tends to keep up free cutaneous transpiration—a process absolutely necessary to perfect health, demands sedulous cultivation. Those who are very cleanly in their persons and in their houses, are more healthy than those who are slovenly, and live amid filth.

What bad consequences result from a neglect of the natural law of cleanliness? These are very numerous. Cutaneous diseases, malignant fevers, and contagious influences generally, are engendered; and various insects—those disgusting appendages of filth and poverty—are encouraged to multiply.

Did the ancients give any heed to the laws of cleanliness? By ranking attention to cleanliness among the religious virtues, and its neglect among the sins, and by instituting ablutions and purifications, ancient lawgivers had demonstrated their knowledge of the good and evil effects attendant on the observance or neglect of its law.

How are the laws that especially interest the preservation of the species named? The laws of hereditary descent; for parents exercise a mighty influence over the physical condition of their offspring. General constitution, bodily qualities, individual peculiarities, diseases, &c., are transmitted from sires to sons.

What are the conditions required to accomplish the laws of hereditary descent? Every person ought to have attained complete growth, and mature solidity of fibre, and also to be in possession of confirmed good health, before putting himself into the way of having a family. Those who marry too young ruin their health, and procreate miserable, dwarfish, and weakly children, whose lives are useless to the commonwealth, and burthensome to themselves. Those, again, who have passed the meridian of life, or have suffered from debilitating causes, before marriage, have also an infirm and degenerate family.

What then should induce abnegation of marriage? No one who has the seeds of hereditary disease, such as scrofula, consumption, insanity, gout, stone, &c., &c., lurking in his constitution, ought to marry.

Do not individuals, sprung from the same stock, commit a grave error when they intermarry? Marriages between near relations are very frequently sterile, or the progeny is bastardized, unpromising, and oftentimes idiotic. For this reason it was that several ancient legislators interdicted such unions. Like misfortunes, although in a less degree, afflict the families that intermarry for a long period of time. The offspring speedily feels a deteriorating influence; its physical and moral powers are enfeebled by degrees, and the race is ultimately extinguished.

What is the most important moment for the body of living beings? It is the moment of receiving existence. The form, dimensions, and texture of the body and its parts, the energy of the vegetative functions, and the whole fate of the future being, in regard to health, disease, &c., depend on this instant.

Marriages ought therefore to be better assorted than they are at present, were it merely to benefit the physical part of man's nature? Greater attention in this particular would spare much sorrow to families. A dwarfish and sickly offspring is in itself a dreadful misfortune, and very often poisons all the pleasures of existence to parents.

Submission to the laws of hereditary descent appears to be of the first-rate importance—does it not? General as well as individual happiness is implicated in their observance. Attention to their dictates will influence the improvement of the species far more than any measure besides that can be taken, and will consequently do more to advantage general happiness than any other exactment whatsoever. The laws of hereditary descent exist; those who submit will be happy and blessed in their offspring, those who neglect them, though they themselves escape, will have prepared abundant cause of misery to their children and to posterity.

How comes it that so little attention has hitherto been paid to the laws of hereditary descent in contracting marriage? Ignorance may in part be blamed, and the dominion of inferior inclinations, particularly of acquisitiveness, love of approbation, and self-esteem, may very fairly be charged with the rest of the transgressions committed against them.

Ought not the laws of hereditary descent to be taught, then? They ought, as soon as young people can understand how they themselves came into the world. Knowledge of these laws could not fail to produce the most beneficial effects; for even personal views would unite with nobler and higher considerations, to make the youth avoid acts and connections that might bring misery to dwell with them for the remainder of their lives. But even admitting the impossibility of finding means that would succeed completely in opening men's eyes—acknowledging the probable continuance of the reign of disorder, we are nevertheless to use every effort in promulgating knowledge, which, acted upon, would render mankind better and more happy. The laws of hereditary descent occupy a place in the foremost rank of importance, and ought never to be lost sight of by the well-wishers of humanity.

What points does the law, in its most comprehensive signification, that governs the physical part of man's nature, comprise? The doing whatever may contribute to the development and preservation of the body, the avoiding all that may militate against this, the putting the

corporeal state into harmony with the exhibition of the intellectual and moral laws, or, in the religious language of the ancients, in making the body a temple and an instrument of Intellect and Morality.

Is practice of the vegetative laws necessary? The existence of these laws and the necessity of submitting to them are synonymous. Without this, man can never prosper or be happy; without this, the accomplishment of the moral and intellectual laws is impossible. The importance, nay the necessity, of conforming strictly to all they ordain, follows irresistibly as a corollary.

SECTION II.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL LAWS OF MAN.

What is the essence of Intelligence, or Understanding? It is, to know. The Intellect alone acquires knowledge, of whatever kind it be.

In what does Intelligence consist—or, what is Intelligence? Intelligence is a word which, at one time, designates a personified principle which knows; at another, no more than an attribute of a principle—the faculty of knowing; sometimes also the name is used to signify the functions collectively which have place with consciousness.

In what are philosophers agreed, in their discussions upon intelligence, and in what do they differ? All agree as to the effects of Intellect; for all assign to it every species of knowledge,—to know is its nature: but differences occur, as to what it is that knows, as to the objects known, the conditions necessary to knowledge, and the various degrees of certainty of our knowledge.

What opinion is the most generally entertained as to that which knows? The greatest number of philosophers speak of, and admit, an incorporeal something, inhabiting man's body, which knows. Others, however, consider knowledge as a function or product of certain organic structures.

How are these two classes of philosophers entitled? The partizans of the first opinion are called Spiritualists, those of the second, Materialists.

What was the literal meaning of the word among the Greeks and Romans, which corresponds to Spirit or Soul among the moderns? Air, or breath.

And by what name is the doctrine of the incorporeal something of man's constitution designated? It is termed Psychology, from the Greek $\psiυχη$ soul, and $λογος$ discourse or doctrine.

What are the ideas most generally entertained concerning this incorporeal part of man? That it inhabits our mortal body, by the medium or assistance of which its operations are variously manifested, and from which it is separated at death, to change its habitation.

By what name have some modern French philosophers entitled the vis, or power which knows, and the result of its activity or knowledge? They have called the power which knows, Sensibility, without paying further attention to its nature, its actual state, or its destiny; and to the product of sensibility, that is, knowledge, they have given the general title, Sensation.

Can we, by reasoning, arrive at conclusions on the nature of that which knows, on its manner of acting, or on its final destination? These are purely subjects of religious belief, and history shows that opinions, the most contradictory and unlikely, have been promulgated and received in regard to them.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this fact? That every individual is to have full permission to believe that which to him seems good and proper, provided neither individual nor general happiness be compromised.

Announcing the fact—Man Knows,—what points are especially to be attended to in examining his knowledge? It is necessary above all things to determine accurately that which he can, and that which he cannot know; to specify the various sorts of knowledge, and indicate the conditions under which each may be acquired; to establish the natural laws, or the regularity with which everything happens; and thus to found on a sure basis the happiness of individuals and of the human kind.

What can man know? Strict reason demonstrates that he only knows his individual identity, and the modified conditions of his self. Plain sense says that man knows, first, his existence, many parts which constitute his frame, many internal functions, called feelings and intellect, or affective and intellectual faculties;—Moreover, that he knows a great number of external objects, as existences; that he further knows their physical qualities, their mutual relations, and their relations with himself and with others; lastly, that he knows regularity, or the laws of all the knowledge he possesses.

How may the external objects of human knowledge be divided? Into *Matters*, and *Spirits or Souls*.

What, according to the ancients, are the characteristics of matter, and of spirit or soul? Matter was characterized by its inertia, and certain qualities styled physical, such as form, size, weight, and impenetrability. Spirit, on the other hand, was distinguished by its formlessness, and its power of conferring activity on matter.

Have opinions on these points been constant? No. Mankind have not at all times recognized the same number either of elementary matters or spirits. Simple substances were long confined to four, but modern chemistry in its progress has augmented the quantity prodigiously.

Under what form does matter occur in the

world? It exists in the solid, liquid, aeriform or imponderable state.

Are not researches upon matter in some of these conditions more especially difficult? Researches upon imponderable bodies are particularly so; for matter in this state is intimately connected with the personified principles which act in the human body; and here, observation and induction, the sole guides to certainty, abandon the investigator.

What difference is there between matter generally and an organized body? Matter may, 1st, be simple; an organized body is always compounded; 2nd, Matter has not been engendered, and has no generative power; organized bodies are products of previously existing individuals, their like: 3rd, Matter of different kinds, however mingled, chemically or mechanically, can never exhibit vital functions after the manner of an organized body.

What are the points of resemblance between matter generally and organized bodies; according to ancients? 1st, Inertia, and 2nd, Each being actuated by immaterial causes or spirits.

To what has the organizing power of the body been ascribed by the old philosophers, and with what degree of accuracy? To the soul or spirit. But this conclusion is not probably correct. A beautiful body follows not necessarily as a consequence of a superior soul, and many very plain persons attach our good opinion, and gain our confidence by their amiable tempers and general good qualities.

What is it impossible for man to know? It is certain that he can know nothing in itself, neither the essence of his own nature, nor that of external objects. The self of the conscious man is nothing more to him than an object of observation. Farther, man cannot know, either the beginning or the end, or final destination of aught that is; he can only observe what is, the conditions under which it is, and the regularity with which the phenomena happen. His knowledge is merely phenomenal.

In what way can man know or acquire knowledge? Only by observing and inducing; for reflection will no more reveal to man his own nature, than it will give him information of external objects, with their physical qualities and their relations. The study of man by the *a priori* method, or reflection, has retarded the knowledge of his nature extremely. Every one who entered on the subject assuming himself as the type of the whole species, confounded his own peculiarities with the essential or general constitution of humanity; as if one blind from birth should do well in imagining all mankind similarly circumstanced. Hence arose as many systems of mental philosophy as there were thinkers.

What can man know of his own nature? First, his body, its constituent parts, its functions, the laws of its preservation, and the laws of propagation; further, his own affective and

intellectual operations, and those of his fellow men; lastly, the conditions necessary to the manifestation of these, and the regularity or laws according to which they appear or are produced.

Man, then, it appears, is destined to know? The law of nature proclaims that he is. Intelligence is as essential a part of man as his body. Without it, neither individuals nor the species could be preserved or continued.

Intelligence being an inherent part of human nature, why do some oppose its cultivation? All who do so are to be regarded with a very suspicious eye. They are such as would lead mankind blindfolded, and obedient to their arbitrary will and pleasure, for selfish and sinister ends. It is unquestionably much easier to render the ignorant and uncultivated subservient to unworthy purposes, than the instructed and reasoning man. Knowledge, too, and the habit of reflection, detect errors which pride and selfishness would willingly keep concealed. The abuses or misapplication of intellect have also been confounded with intellect itself. Now, intellect only supplies the means of executing, it gives not the motive or aim of the action.—As religion is not the less respectable because of the crimes committed in its name, neither is intellect because of its abuses.

Is it not reasonable, then, to cultivate the understanding? The cultivation of the Intellect, provided justice and truth be made the objects of research, is not only reasonable, but is a prime duty.

What is the second natural law of Intelligence? It is this. The different manifestations of man are inexplicable, on the supposition of one simple cause; in other words: Man in his nature possesses determinate, specific, and distinct causes of his different modes of feeling and thinking.

How do they, who admit the entity self, explain man's different kinds of knowledge? By supposing this agent, self, endowed with a number of primary faculties; they also recognize various conditions, as necessary to the exhibition of mental phenomena.

What is the usual division of the primary faculties of the agent, self? It is into Understanding and Will; a division which has been recognized from remote antiquity, and differently entitled—Head and Heart, Spirit and Flesh, Intellect and Moral Faculties, Modes of Thinking and Modes of Feeling.

What is the meaning of the word, Will? To Will various meanings are attached. Philosophers commonly understand by it, all desires collectively, and all degrees in any particular desire, from simple inclination up to passion. Hence they speak of weak and of strong wills; and farther, of good and of bad wills also. Will, again, sometimes denotes the desire which predominates. Feeling one inclination; if another arise and overcome the

former, the second is called Will. There is still another kind of will, which may be called enlightened, because it implies a desire approved of by intelligence.

Is will, as designating desires, not confined to the faculties which experience Sentiments? No; for, that every faculty, being active, desires, is a perfectly general proposition, and therefore includes such faculties as procure knowledge also.

Seeing that the philosophical nomenclature is so faulty, and that those faculties that know, desire or manifest Will, would it not be well to give a distinguishing title to all the powers that merely excite feelings, without acquiring any knowledge? Certainly it would. And as the faculties which do not know, produce especially what are called affections, affective faculties will accurately express their distinguishing nature.

What knows, or takes cognizance of the affective powers? The intellect. To know, is the peculiar and proper character of the faculties which enter into its constitution.

How is the Intellect or the Understanding divided? It is commonly supposed to be possessed of certain attributes entitled faculties, such as Attention, Perception, Memory, Imagination, and Judgment. Occasionally the Understanding has been said to know, according to certain forms or categories. Kant, for instance, observes that the Spirit or Intellect must represent all it knows in space and time.

How is Attention defined? Philosophers have considered Attention to be the primary faculty which acts in the acquisition of every sort of knowledge.

Can Attention be truly esteemed a primary faculty of the mind? If it be, it behoves philosophers to show the causes of its various degrees and different kinds of activity. For one may manifest a peculiar sort of Attention strongly, another weakly, and be altogether incapable of exhibiting a third. Now all these facts are incompatible with the philosophic idea of Attention being a primary faculty.

What is Attention then? Attention is the effect of the entity self aroused by the active state of the affective and intellectual faculties. Its strength is proportioned to the degree of energy of the acting powers, that is, of the powers which attend.

Can we, on this showing, explain, why, without Attention, no one can succeed in any art or science? Readily. Attention is synonymous with activity, and certainly success is impossible without activity of the respective faculties.

How is perception defined? Perception, or Consciousness, according to philosophers, is that faculty which takes cognizance of impressions, whether external or internal. Each of these two orders of impressions includes many species, which may be perceived separately. We may hear and not see, see and not hear;

we may perceive, or be conscious of, the forms of objects, and not of their dimensions and colours; perceive the harmony of colours, and not of tones; be conscious of attachment and not of fear, of pride and not of benevolence; and so on. Knowledge of any impression whatever, is Perception; there are consequently as many kinds of perception as of faculties which furnish impressions.

What general title may be given to the organic conditions which procure impressions? The general term, Sense. Internal as well as external senses might be spoken of with propriety; and perception—a common quality, would appear stripped of all pretensions to rank as a primary faculty of mind.

What is Memory? Memory is, by many philosophers, regarded as a fundamental power, but it is in truth nothing more than the repetition by intellectual faculties of previously received impressions. The species of memory therefore are as numerous as the faculties which know. The different kinds of memory, and the various degrees of activity exhibited by each, are inexplicable by the hypothesis of a simple cause; as inexplicable indeed as are the different species of knowledge on such a supposition.

How comes it that attention strengthens Memory? Attention and Memory are alike effects of an active state of the faculties which know. Energetic actions of these, accompanied by clear perceptions, leave strong impressions, which are afterwards reproduced with more ease than such as have been so weak and transient as to be but little noted. Moreover, the faculty which takes cognizance of the phenomenal world, exercises an influence over the powers which know, and by exciting, better enables them to repeat their functions, and thus strengthens memory.

What is the mental phenomenon, entitled Reminiscence? It is the consciousness of the repetition of any sensation or previously acquired knowledge.

Is Reminiscence a primary faculty? No, it is but an effect of a repetition of its function by that faculty which takes cognizance of the phenomenal world—Eventuality.

What is understood by Imagination? Imagination is a word which is variously interpreted. Sometimes it is used to designate a faculty that makes man act spontaneously, and causes him to invent in any way. A mechanician invents ingenious machines, a musician composes musical pieces, a mathematician discovers new problems—all is done by Imagination. Sometimes the word denotes an exalted and peculiar manner of feeling, and in this sense, Imagination is a sentiment or distinct affective faculty, capable of being combined with all the other faculties.

Is there any primary faculty of Imagination taken as synonymous with the capacity of In-

vention? None. It is only a consequence of the intellectual combined with the affective faculties, each in a high state of activity.

Is there any primary faculty of Association? Many philosophers speak of such a fundamental power, but it is a mere effect of several distinct and varied causes; in other words, the actions of the primary faculties are associated. Each being active, excites and acts along with one or two, or more, of the others.

How is association among the intellectual faculties styled? Association of Ideas.

The mode of action, called Association, however, is not confined to the intellectual faculties? It may be observed among the affective also, and between the affective and intellectual powers reciprocally. The mutual influence of the faculties is quite general. Any one whatsoever in a state of activity may excite any one or any number of others.

How is Judgment defined by philosophers? It is considered as a primitive faculty, which compares perceived impressions, finds them harmonious or discordant, and approves or disapproves of them. But Judgment is in fact a qualitative mode of action of the intellectual faculties. Species of knowledge act on the sentiment being in conformity with certain laws, which however admit of modifications to a certain extent. Now the faculties that know their appropriate impressions respectively, are affected in a manner which they approve or disapprove, and in this way may be said to judge. Judgment, consequently, is only the announcement of the mode of being affected by impressions received and known. There are consequently as many kinds of Judgment as species of knowledge or faculties which know; there is a Judgment in forms, another in colours, a third in tones, and so on; and Judgment individually depends on the special powers which appreciate forms, colours, tones, &c.

Can Judgment be correctly spoken of as good or bad? The faculties are subject to certain laws, and their actions are either perfect or imperfect. Good Judgment is the attendant of the first, bad Judgment of the second, state. He who listens to music, perceives the harmony of the tones, or he does not; and is thus possessed or is not possessed of a musical judgment. He who has the faculties which are necessary to appreciate tones in their greatest state of perfection, has the best Judgment in music; and he who has them the least complete, has the worst Judgment in this particular. It is the same in regard to every other kind of knowledge.

Are the laws, according to which different species of knowledge have place, arbitrary? By no means; they present all the characters of natural laws. They inhere in human nature, are essentially the same in all places and at all times, and harmonise with the whole of the vegetative and moral laws of man. Be it

observed, however, that it is the essence alone of the faculties which is pervaded by this universal regularity. Modifications of the powers occur constantly and in great variety. Some actions, results of their activity, may be considered as good and excellent at one time, and bad and reprehensible at another. Certain kinds of knowledge, certain ideas, may prevail at particular periods; even errors may gain accedence and be in vogue, but truth and essential excellence will not therefore be annihilated; sooner or later, by one or another, they will be felt, and be made supreme.

Are there not certain Judgments which are universally accounted good or bad? Yes. All civilized men would say of him, who should feed on loathsome articles which could not nourish his body, that he had a bad taste. In the same way, he who admits ideas which are mutually contradictory, will be by all accounted to have a bad Judgment. On the other hand, the effects of certain intellectual operations will always meet approval. The music of Handel and of Mozart, the colouring of Titian, the sculpture of the old Greeks, and the Christian system of morals, will secure approbation, so long as the feeling for the melody and harmony of sounds, capacity to perceive colour, power to appreciate fine forms, and admiration of virtue, belong to, and form constituents in, the nature of man.

Is reason a fundamental power of the mind? No, this term indicates the functions of Comparison and Casuality severally or in combination.

What is the aim of reason? Reason is given to direct the functions of all the other special powers of the mind, and to bring them into harmony; without being guided by reason, every faculty is liable to errors.

Since reason is essential in preventing the errors of the other faculties, is it free from erring? Reason acts according to determinate principles, but it does not furnish the objects on which it operates, hence it will err each time when the premises or objects of its activity are not truly furnished.

Since many mistakes have thus been made in regard to the powers of the mind, how can we, by reasoning, arrive at a knowledge of its special faculties? A faculty will, by reason, be recognized as special, 1st, when it exists in one species of animal and not in another. 2d, When its manifestations are not in proportion to those of the other faculties, neither in the different sexes nor in the same individual. 3d, When its manifestations may be singly healthy or singly diseased. 4th, When its manifestations do not appear nor disappear simultaneously with those of the other powers. 5th, When it can alone, or singly repose. 6th, When it is transmitted in a distinct manner from parents to children. The same mode of proof applies to the special affective, as well as

the special intellectual, faculties. Observation and induction must lead to the knowledge of both.

How is the existence of any special faculty whatever to be proved by observation? By the recognition of a relation between special manifestation and particular organic apparatus.

What are the affective faculties of man?
* Desire of Life. † Desire of Meat and Drink.

1. Sense of Amativeness. 2. Sense of Parental Love, or Love of Offspring. 3. Sense of Habitation. 4. Sense of Attachment. 5. Sense of Courage. 6. Sense of Destroying. 7. Sense of Secresy. 8. Sense of Acquiring or Collecting. 9. Sense of Constructing. 10. Sense of Self-esteem. 11. Sense of Approbation and Notoriety. 12. Sense of Cautiousness. 13. Sense of Benevolence. 14. Sense of Reverence. 15. Sense of Firmness and Perseverance. 16. Sense of Conscientiousness. 17. Sense of Hope. 18. Sense of Marvellousness. 19. Sense of the Ideal and Perfect. 20. Sense of Mirth and Humour. 21. Sense of Imitation.

What are the Intellectual faculties of man?

1. Five external Senses which convey to him peculiar impressions of the external world. 2. A faculty which personifies these impressions, and presents them as separate from the organs of external sense. This faculty seems to procure him notions of individual existence. 3. Particular faculties which know the Physical Qualities of objects, as Configuration, Size, Weight, and Colour. 4. A particular faculty which knows what passes in objects and their qualities, that is, which cognizes the phenomenal world. The same faculty seems also to turn into knowledge all sensations felt in the body; as pain, fatigue, the necessity of different evacuations, cold, heat, and, lastly, the activity of all the affective powers. 5. Particular faculties which conceive notions of the Localities of objects, of Time or duration, whether of objects, or of phenomena and their succession; of Melody; of Number; whether of objects, qualities, phenomena, or tones; of Order, whether in objects, in physical qualities, in phenomena, in localities, in succession, or in number. 6. A particular faculty which cognizes Analogy or Difference, Similitude or Dissimilitude, and Identity, and establishes harmony; and another which appreciates the Causes of objects and of phenomena. 7. A particular faculty which knows and presides over the signs of artificial language.

What is understood by the Passions, and by the Affections? These words denote modes of action of the primary faculties. Passion expresses the highest degree of their activity; affection the mere general mode of their being affected.

Then neither the Affections nor the Passions are primary powers of the mind? The preceding reply authorises a negative.

How may the Affections be subdivided? 1st, Into modes of quality and modes of quantity; in other words, the primary faculties may procure modified sensations, and they may be more or less active. 2d, Affections are *general, common, or special*; that is, certain modes of being affected belong to the whole of the primary powers, to several, to one only, and to each individually. Thus, Pleasure and Pain are general affections. Memory belongs to the intellectual faculties in common, and Compassion is a special affection of the faculty of Benevolence. 3d, Affections are *simple or compound*; that is to say, they result from the individual activity of one faculty, or from the simultaneous activity of several. For instance, Fear is a simple affection of the faculty of Circumspection; Shame, a compound affection of the faculties of Justice and Love of Approbation. 4th, Affections are *agreeable or disagreeable*. 5th, Affections are *common to animals and man, or they are proper and peculiar to man*, as well as the faculties themselves which are their causes.

When the Passions are spoken of, why do mankind generally think of sensual pleasures and inferior sentiments, as love of notoriety, pride, and self-interest? Because the affective powers in general, and those in particular, in which these inclinations inhere, are commonly very energetic among men, and because their activity is extremely dangerous to the peace and well-being of society.

Concluding from what has gone before, how are the functions, designated as primary faculties in the schools of philosophy, to be regarded? Only as *effects*, or as modes of action in regard to quantity and quality of the mind's fundamental powers.

And what is to be thought of the philosophic nomenclature? That it is extremely defective. Every expression has several significations, and none designates a cause or primary faculty, but merely an effect or action.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this position? That the ideas of the schools are inexact. Ideas and the signs that express them are intimately related. Ideas precede, and as they are precise, signs follow correspondingly numerous and exact.

The philosophical nomenclature requires a reform, then? It stands in great need of it, as well as philosophical principles themselves.

In remodelling and determining the nomenclature of the philosophy of man, what course would be proper to pursue? It would be necessary to assume signs to express, 1st, Primary faculties. 2d, Qualitative modes of action of the faculties. 3d, Degrees of activity, or quantitative modes of the faculties. 4th, Modes of several faculties simultaneously active. 5th, Different actions resulting whether from primary faculties simply active, from their modes, or their mutual influence. To illustrate this

procedure take Benevolence.—This sign denotes a primary faculty of the mind; Compassion designates a qualitative mode of the power; Great, Much, Little, Weak, quantitative modes of the same; Equity is simultaneous activity with Justice, the inferior sentiments being subordinate; Christian Charity, its union with the whole of the primary powers besides, in a perfect state of harmony.

What generic name may be aptly used to express every function of the affective and intellectual faculties? Sensation will designate any degree of activity or other mode of every faculty. Every perceived impression is a species of Sensation.

How do Sensations become Conceptions or Ideas? This happens by Intellect representing to itself sensation. One may perceive the sensation of hunger internally, and without saying 'I am hungry;' knowledge of the existence of sensations constitutes Conceptions or Ideas.

What signification is attached to the word Idea? This term has been the subject of much discussion. Etymologically considered, it signifies, *image or figure*; but in this acceptation there are not many Ideas; odours, tastes, colours, are all excluded. Besides, by the dominant philosophy of the present day, and in opposition to Aristotle, impressions, and not images, are maintained to be perceived by the Soul. Several philosophers have also extended the meaning of the word Idea, and made it to signify Knowledge of all external impressions. But when the etymological signification is once abandoned, there can be no reason for not calling knowledge, both of external and internal impressions, Idea. One might then have an Idea of hunger, of fear, and of anger, as well as of colour, sound, figure, or dimension.

What is the third natural law of Intelligence? It is as follows: the knowledge of man's mental nature may become as exact and positive as that of his physical constitution.

What are the principal points to be noted, touching man's mental nature? They are, 1st, The primary faculties that enter into its position. 2d, The origin of these. 3d, The fixed laws of their functions. 4th, The causes of modifications of their functions. 5th, The moral and religious laws.

What is the true method of proving the existence of the primary faculties which constitute man's mental part? It is still observation and induction. Philosophers have long disputed upon the special faculties of the human mind. From time to time, a greater or smaller number has been admitted, but all that has yet been written or said has not been applicable beyond the limited sphere of individual conviction. When by observation the relations which subsist between the cerebral apparatus and the special powers of the mind shall have been demonstrated, the philosophy

of man will become a positive and invariable science.

Physiology is therefore useful and aidant in the philosophy of man? Physiology and the Philosophy of Mind are two sciences inseparable. They are mutually accomplotive.

What are the characteristics of exact knowledge? Exact knowledge is characterized in the same way as the natural laws. That which is, is, has been, and will be, demonstrable for ever. It is of the highest importance to be convinced that truth and exact knowledge of every kind are, and must be in harmony.

What is the origin of the primary faculties of man? They are innate in his constitution.

Has this truth been long known? From the remotest antiquity. The ancients even went so far as to maintain that Ideas were innate.

What then is actually innate in man? The essence of the primary powers, various capacities of activity, and peculiar modifications of function, according to sex or individuals.

Have the faculties been, by all the schools, considered as innate? No; many philosophers have maintained that man comes into the world a *tabula rasa*, a smooth and fair surface, and that all his capacities and actions are effects of external circumstances.

What are the chief extraneous circumstances which have been believed to be the causes of man's actions? Want, Society, Opportunity, Climate, Food, and, above all, Education.

What is the extent of the influence of extraneous circumstances? They are often necessary to permit the exhibition of natural dispositions, but they can by no possibility produce any faculty; sometimes, too, they develop innate capacity, and exercise the faculties. Further, Education may give a determinate bent to the innate powers; and make them elicit specific actions.—A Mussulman and a Christian are both devout from the same innate feeling, but the former may think it his duty to make at least once in his life a pilgrimage to Mecca, and the latter to sing hymns in praise of God.

How has the innateness of their simple dispositions, or of their effects—actions, been explained? Their cause has been sought, sometimes in the presence of immaterial agents, named Spirits or Souls, sometimes in organization; either generally, or in that of the abdominal and thoracic viscera, of the external senses, and of the brain especially.

How does determinate knowledge originate? From the innate primary capacities which know, and the impressions which are known.

Do all possess the innate primary faculties in equal degrees of activity? No; experience proves that their energy varies extremely in different individuals.

What is the cause of this diversity of endow-

ment? It inheres partly in man, and partly belongs to extraneous circumstances.

What is meant by an universal genius? He who could appreciate and acquire thoroughly every species and variety of knowledge, would be an universal genius. Genius does not signify a special power of mind, but the highest degree of activity of any intellectual faculty. Now, although we may conceive a being possessed of all the powers in their best and most energetic state, it is not probable that any such has ever visited, or is ever likely to visit the world.

Is it possible or probable that mankind may, in some future age, agree in their manners of feeling and thinking? As men are constituted at the present time, it must be admitted that they cannot agree, even upon the essentials of their mental functions, or of the judgments they pronounce. Harmony and unanimity, however, as essentials are concerned, will be possible, nay will prevail whenever the natural laws are recognized as the rules of conduct, and their commands are enforced and obeyed. But mankind can never accord on the modifications of their affective and intellectual faculties.

When we perceive that the corporeal and intellectual parts of man are governed by invariable laws, can we suppose that his moral part, the most noble of all, is abandoned to chance—abstracted from the influence of all natural law? To think so is a grievous error,—an error that has been the source of many of the evils that afflict humanity. Man's moral nature is regulated by determinate laws. So vast is the importance and so great and salutary the influence of this proposition, that it should become an article of universal belief among mankind.

SECTION III.

OF THE MORAL LAWS.

Is man naturally a moral being?—that is, a being who, by his own nature, views his actions in relation to duty and justice? Yes: there is in his constitution an inherent sentiment, entitled Moral Conscience, which produces such an effect.

Are the moral precepts of all men alike? No; for the act which is considered just in one country, is often looked on as unjust in another.

What is the cause of this diversity of decision? The sentiment of conscientiousness does not determine that which is just or unjust, it only feels the necessity of being just. The majority of mankind take for granted whatever they are told is right; and assume as just the precepts to which they have been accustomed from infancy. Among the few who think, Intellect determines Justice; but the conclusions are still influenced by the general mental frame.

How may conscience be divided? Into Absolute and Individual. The first is Conscience as it ought to be for all men; the second, as its name implies, is the Conscience of individuals.

In what does the Absolute Conscience of man consist? In the sentiment of conscientiousness combined with the whole of the faculties peculiar to man, those common to the human kind and animals being held in subjection.

In what does Individual Conscience consist? It results from the sentiment of conscientiousness combined with the other faculties of individuals. He, therefore, who possesses the superior sentiments in great activity, will esteem those notions and actions as unjust, which another, whose inferior feelings are strong, and superior weak, would look upon as just. Intellect, it thus appears, is corrupted or swayed by the affective powers, and admits as just whatever these recognize as agreeable.

Can we trust to the Individual Consciences of mankind? No; it is impossible. Many feel very slightly the desire and necessity of being just, and seldom or never think of examining their actions with relation to moral rectitude. Besides, people are frequently misled in their moral judgments by the influence of other feelings; and many things which the standard of Absolute Conscience pronounces unjust, pass for just when estimated by individual manners of judging.

Ought not the moral laws therefore to be studied, determined, and proposed as obligatory? Certainly; Conscience should be Positive.

Is there any difference between Positive and Absolute Conscience? There ought to be none. In the world, however, Positive Conscience, or the Law, has most commonly been a product of the Individual Consciences of legislators.

Has the Natural Moral Law, or Absolute Conscience, any distinguishing characters? It has all those of the natural laws generally.*

Have men any right to make moral laws? They have none, any more than to fabricate laws to regulate their vegetative and intellectual functions. They cannot change the law of propagation, nor of alimentation, nor of any other functional operation; they can form no conception of an object without dimensions and figure; they cannot conceive an effect without a cause; neither can they love pain, nor approve internally of that they perceive to be bad or immoral.

Who made the moral laws of man? The same Great Cause that traced the laws of man's physical and intellectual parts also instituted laws for the regulation of his moral nature—God, the Author of the universe.

How does the Creator make known or reveal his laws? To inform man of his enactments, God has endowed him with understanding, to observe and to learn those that implicate his

physical and intellectual natures; and has implanted in his interior, sentiments which make him feel the moral laws.

Is there not another source whence knowledge of Moral Laws is derived? Yes, Revelation; that is, knowledge communicated by God to man in a supernatural manner.

What are the advantages of Revelation? It is chiefly advantageous as it regulates man's uncertain notions of his Creator, and of his duties universally.

Can man, in the study of his vegetative and intellectual natures, acquire a greater quantity of knowledge than God has revealed to him? There can be no doubt of it.

Can the revelation of Moral Laws change or annihilate the laws of the vegetative and intellectual functions? To say it can, would be absurd, as putting God in contradiction with himself; for the God who reveals the moral duties and the God who creates the physical and intellectual functions are one and the same.

Are the advocates of the natural laws Atheists? On the contrary, they entertain the most noble, the most pure, ideas of God; they never suppose him in contradiction with himself; they regard him as the Impartial Parent of the universe, who treats all his children with equal kindness, who applies his laws without variation, and without any distinction of persons.

Are the advocates of the natural laws changeable and arbitrary in their judgments? No; they recognize but one law for all men,—for the teacher and the taught, the governor and the governed. They have one determinate and invariable standard for their rule of conduct.

Are the disciples of the natural laws hostile to the Christian code of morality? No; there they find traces of wisdom truly divine; the better they know its precepts, the more do they admire. Indeed they cannot do otherwise than approve, for they see that true Christian morality is the morality of nature, announced in a positive manner; they, therefore, hope it will speedily be repurified from the pagan, profitless, and superstitious observances with which its excellence has been contaminated, and its lustre obscured.

What is the summary of the natural law of morality? The faculties proper to man constitute his moral nature; whatever, therefore, is in conformity to the whole of these is morally good; whatever is in opposition to them is morally bad.

What are the principal faculties which are peculiar to man? Reverence, Marvellousness, Ideality, Causality, and in a certain degree Benevolence, Justice, and Hope.

Man's powers being innate, do they act irresistibly? God in giving powers does not inflict the necessity of their acting.

How far are the actions of Man to be called

* See page 3.

necessary, and how far are they free? They are necessary as far as there is no effect without cause and as they depend on motives. They are free as far as they are under the control of other powers, and whenever a choice among the motives takes place.

Is the liberty of man unlimited? No, it is subject to conditions.

Which are the necessary conditions of freedom? 1. Intellect to make a choice among motives. 2. A plurality of motives. 3. The influence of intellect on voluntary motion.

How does liberty acquire the character of Morality? By the victory of the powers proper to man over his brute nature.

Is it a difficult or an easy task to practise natural morality? It is one of extreme difficulty. Man is universally inclined to break the natural laws. There is no perfectly just man.

Is there a natural cause of moral evil? Many religious systems recognize a primitive seduction effected by an evil spirit, often represented under the form of a serpent; but the cause which continues to prompt man to infringe the moral law is in himself.

Are there then any bad faculties in man? No faculty of human nature can be bad in itself,—the Author of the whole is all perfection. The faculties are neither good nor bad; it is their employment only to which these titles can be applied.

Is it reasonable to decry human nature? It is absurd to decry human nature, and at the same time to exalt religion, which is a part of the human constitution, and to teach that man is made in the likeness of God.

Has the Creator willed the moral evil of man? Such an opinion is incompatible with the notion of a supremely benevolent and all-wise God.

Is man then destined for happiness? To suppose an infinitely good Creator delighting in the misery of his creatures, is repugnant to good sense, and to propriety of feeling. Man, says Moses, was happy until the moment of his disobedience.

What are the synonyms of Happiness and Misery? They are the words of Pleasure and Pain.

Is Pleasure good or evil? It is frequently neither the one nor the other, and it may occasionally be both; though, in itself, Pleasure can never be evil, seeing that it accompanies the activity of every fundamental power, and that man possesses certain faculties solely destined for his amusement; music, for instance, painting, sculpture, and the feeling that inspires mirth and laughter.

Can Pleasure be the end or aim of man's existence? No; because some acts evidently bad are accompanied with pleasure.—The wicked man is pleased in his iniquity. We are therefore commanded by Morality to renounce plea-

sure as often as the faculties we possess in common with animals are in opposition to those peculiar to our humanity, or whenever these are not in harmony with each other.

What is the grand cause of the moral misery of man? It consists in the great activity of the inferior or animal faculties. These, when combated by the moral nature, suffer pain from the restraint. Moreover, the desires they originate are insatiable; the more they are indulged, the more they crave indulgence.

Is it probable that the struggle which accompanies good conduct is a natural arrangement? Yes; for without the necessity of combating the inferior propensities and sentiments, there could be no such thing as Virtue. This implies a victory, which is not to be won without an adversary, and courage to make resistance.

Since the Creator ordained that man should struggle, has he also decreed his fall? Reason and Morality proclaim the contrary.

What must be done to render mankind happy? They must be made morally good, to the end that they may love moral actions; in other words, the activity of the faculties peculiar to man must be increased, and the energy of those held in common with animals diminished.

By what title are good actions distinguished, and what is he called who practises them? Good actions are entitled Virtues; and he who practises the virtues is styled Virtuous.

Whence were these words derived, and what was their original meaning? They came from the Latin; and signified primarily, force or strength. This, indeed, may be physical, or it may be moral; but among the Romans, as among other warlike nations, bodily strength combined with courage was considered a most valuable quality. And since moral actions require an internal struggle, to render human nature, properly so called, triumphant, the title, Virtue, was also applied here.

Is there any difference between the natural laws and the natural virtues? When the words, Law and Virtue, are used synonymously, the laws and virtues of nature are identical. But if Law be employed to signify the regularity with which forces act, and phenomena appear, and Virtue to denote the just employment of the faculties, a distinction between the two becomes necessary.

How may virtuous actions be divided? According as the Divine laws, or the laws imposed by Men, are concerned.

How may the Civil laws—laws imposed by men, be subdivided? 1st, According to the nature of the legislative power, as Despotic, Arbitrary, or Conventional laws. 2d, According to the situations or circumstances for which they are contrived, as the Civil code of laws, the Penal code, Commercial code, &c.

How may Divine laws—laws instituted by God, be subdivided? Into Natural and Re-

vealed. These two orders, however, must of necessity harmonize. To suppose that they differ, would be to suppose God in contradiction with himself.

What then is the touchstone by which the excellence of a law, styled Revealed, or any interpretation of it, may be tried? Laws styled Revealed, and interpretations of them, are perfect in proportion as they harmonize with the laws of the Creator, or possess the characteristics of a Natural law.

What are the objects in relation to which Virtues and Vices are distinguished? 1st, The Creator. 2d, The beings of creation. 3d, The agent, or being who acts. 4th, His family. 5th, His nation. 6th, Mankind at large.

How are laws denominated when considered in regard to their Divine origin? They are called Religious.

And how are laws entitled when the necessity of man's submitting to, and practising them, is the view taken? They are then named Moral.

May the Religious and Moral laws be separately considered? Religious and Moral laws are intimately connected, yet not so intimately as to preclude the possibility or the propriety of considering each class under a separate head.

CHAPTER I.

OF MORALITY.

In what does a Moral doctrine consist? It is a doctrine of rights and of duties, and of those things which are, and of those things which are not, to be done.

What is to be understood by moral philosophy? The term *moral* is sometimes used in opposition to *physical*, also styled *natural*; and the moral philosophy means the doctrine of the Mind; but the same term also signifies the higher powers of Man in opposition to his brute nature, and in that sense moral philosophy is the same as *Ethics*, the doctrine of rights and of duties, or of the moral precepts which admit of proof by reasoning, and which bear the character of conviction.

As to rights—has man any right over God? He has none.

What duties has man towards his Maker? To obey His will in all things.

What rights has man over the beings of creation generally? Man's superior endowment in faculties elevates him far above all else that lives, and he has a natural title to profit by his situation. Such a law is universal; it extends throughout the whole chain of created things.

Can we, then, with propriety say that all was made solely for man? It is ill-directed pride alone that has promoted the conception of the utterance of such an assertion. Every creature advantages itself at the expense of others; and if man turn the whole to his profit, he only follows the common course of nature. This, however is far from showing that all was made

solely for him. Geology, indeed, proves, that many beings inhabited the earth before the human kind was called into existence.

Has man rights only over those creatures which, with himself, enjoy existence? No; he has duties also towards them. Neither the physical nor the purely animal nature knows aught of duty; but to these, man unites a third, which causes him to view his actions in relation to morality. An essential faculty of the moral man is Benevolence, and this forbids him to torment sentient beings for his pleasure. All cruelty to animals is, therefore, interdicted by Natural Morality.

Is there a natural law that allows man to kill animals for the sake of their flesh as food? Many tribes of the lower animals only live by shedding blood. Now, the brute portion of his nature leads man to destroy, just as it does the inferior creatures. Man's anatomical structure proves also that he is fitted to live upon flesh; and further, he thrives on such food. Still, his benevolence ought to restrain him from the commission of every act of cruelty, either against the lower animals or his fellow men.

What Virtues may be entitled Individual? Every action whose end is development and preservation of the body, the understanding, and the moral character of the Individual.

Wherein consists the difference between Individual Virtues and those Virtues which regard Families, Nations, and the whole Human kind? It lies in the employment that is made of the corporeal, affective, and intellectual powers, to further the happiness of ourselves, of our families, or of mankind in general.

Which of these Virtues is the most excellent and ennobling? That which interests the whole human kind is eminently superior to all the rest. True it is, indeed, that this is generally lost sight of altogether. In the appreciation of the Virtues, the scale of their worth is commonly reversed. Most men think first of themselves, then of their families, then of their country, and seldom expend a thought upon humanity at large. There are even few who recognize the happiness of the species as the aim of man's existence, and the subordination of all else to this. Yet nature shows most evidently that she does all for the species; she universally sacrifices individuals to its preservation. Moreover, desire of self-preservation inheres in all animals, love of family and of country in a smaller number, but love of the entire species is a distinguishing character of man in his best estate.

Is it to be expected that man will speedily practise the virtue of universal love? No; hitherto the happiness of countries has been sacrificed to that of families and of individuals; but general philanthropy is commonly decried and scouted as an aberration of the understanding; and this, too, in despite of the express command of Christianity.

The basis of natural morality being determined, and the sources of good and evil being ascertained to be internal,† what method may be advantageously pursued in examining Virtuous and Vicious actions?* These may be considered according to primary faculties, as it is their employment that is good or bad.

What Virtues belong to the sexual propensity? Chastity, and the gratification of the appetite guided by the laws of hereditary descent.

Are Continence and Chastity useful to individuals? Moderation in sexual indulgence promotes bodily strength, and favours health. Hence the *Athletæ* of antiquity were enjoined Continence during their preparations for exhibiting feats of strength and agility.

Is the Continence enforced in monastic institutions to be regarded as an absolute virtue? To entitle it to such consideration, it must be proved advantageous to individuals, to communities, and to the species at large.

What evil effects attend on Celibacy? The unwedded are apt to become selfish, and to neglect the social and domestic virtues. Celibacy, therefore, may sometimes be a vice.

Why did Jesus Christ, our model of Justice upon earth, advise his disciples against marriage? Probably that they might have all leisure and liberty to teach and spread abroad the knowledge of the new doctrine.

Is there any merit in abnegating marriage through love of the public good? Celibacy on such grounds is an act of the greatest virtue.

Can Celibacy under any circumstances be an error? Yes, when denial disturbs the general functions of the body; when it destroys appetite, causes sleeplessness, and induces unhealthy action of any sort; or when it occasions hypocrisy and mendacity, for instance, in those who make a religious virtue of it, and act in opposition to their professions.

What are the Vices of the sexual propensity? Libertinage, seduction, adultery, and incest.

What are the consequences of Libertinage? Bodily infirmity, mental weakness, the contraction of bad habits and of disease, the ruin of fortune, and a thousand ills beside.

Why should Chastity be a greater virtue, and Incontinence a greater vice, among females than males? Because the latter superinduces the same diseases in both sexes, and the bodies of women being less robust than those of men, they suffer more from their effects. Women too are exposed to all the inconveniences that precede, accompany, and follow child-bearing; and becoming mothers illegally, if, as is more than probable, they be abandoned by their seducers, they find themselves shunned by society, and burthened with a family without adequate means of support. Victims of self-reproach, sunk in wretchedness, and disgusted with life, they can only look forward to the grave as the goal at which their miseries may terminate.

* See page 15.

† See page 16.

Is Polygamy agreeable or contrary to the law of natural morality? Polygamy has only obtained among men through excessive activity of the sexual propensity in individuals, and the right of the strongest. There are certainly not more females than males born, and the law which says, 'Love thy neighbour as thyself,' forbids appropriation, if it can be effected only by robbing others of the share of enjoyment destined for them by nature. Polygamy is therefore in opposition to the natural law of morality.

What should be required in the parties who would contract marriage? They ought to possess all the conditions required by the laws of hereditary descent.*

What individuals should abstain from marrying? All who have the seeds of a serious hereditary malady in their constitution; all who are weak in body or in mind; and all who have the distinguishing attributes of humanity in small proportions. Such abstinence would be of far more importance to mankind than the celibacy practised by the teachers of religion and morality in some countries.

Is it not improper to insist so strongly on the laws of hereditary descent, seeing that they limit a natural desire, implanted by the Creator? By no means. Not only the laws of hereditary descent, but also the sexual appetite, are of divine origin; and it is much rather a crime to be ignorant of the laws of hereditary descent, or, knowing them, to neglect their practice, than recklessly to indulge the sexual propensity.

Is Incest a crime against natural morality? It appears to be so; for those families, of which the near relations intermarry, degenerate.

Is Adultery also an infringement of the natural laws? Yes; because it causes disorder, destroys conjugal confidence, and ruins domestic order and tranquillity.

Is marriage or union for life, an institution of nature? Yes; even animals, especially many birds, are united for the term of their lives, and man is so likewise in obedience to a law which inheres in the faculty of Attachment, and this is common to himself and the lower animals.

Is Divorce permitted by natural morality? Yes. The couples which have no family, or which can provide for the children they may have, in as far as justice requires, do well to separate rather than to continue to live in perpetual warfare. The consequences which follow ill assorted unions are much more serious to the parties, to their children, and to society at large, than such as attend on divorce. Were the sexes what they ought to be, there would indeed be no occasion to permit divorce. The conjugal union would then, without any restraint, terminate with life. In the mean time, however, divorce should be obtainable, seeing that the social institutions ought to be the sources of happiness, and not of misery. And

* See page 7.

whatever lessens happiness and causes misery, is evil, and contrary to nature.

What are the virtues of Love of Offspring? The care which parents take in aiding the bodily and mental development of their children, in cultivating their talents, and superintending habits useful to themselves and to their fellow-men; in a word, the efforts given to bring them up in the knowledge and practice of truth and justice.

Is such parental virtue common? It is unfortunately very rare. Children are generally produced without a thought given to the laws of hereditary descent, and reared merely to please, or serve as pastimes to their parents; who more commonly attend to what may flatter their own capricious tastes, than to what may be substantially useful to their children and the commonwealth. Children are frequently spoiled through indulgent weakness, (when their waywardness and unruliness are insufferable,) or they are forced to a mean and slavish submissiveness of deportment, equally unpleasing and pernicious. To give a good direction to Philoprogenitiveness requires a complete knowledge of human nature generally, and of the qualities necessary to guide the individuals—the particular subjects of attention.

What are the fundamental duties of parents to their children? To procure them a good organic constitution, to exercise those faculties with which they are endowed, and to choose them a suitable profession; to instruct them in the laws of their Creator, to show them the necessity of submitting to these, and to set the example of obedience.

Is it the duty of parents to leave riches to their children? Natural morality forbids the accumulation of riches; and surely parents cannot be obliged to do aught which may pave the way to the immorality and degeneracy of their children.

Have parents a natural right to obedience from their children? So long as children remain dependent on their parents, they are bound to obey them, but this obligation ceases with the state of dependence.

What are the duties of children towards their parents? Children, so long as they are dependent, must respect their parents as superiors and benefactors, and repay the attachment and tender cares they have received with interest, during the term of their lives. The child when born is indebted to parental love for the very continuance of its life, and old age has frequent occasion for the aids of filial piety and affection.

What are the duties of a husband? He ought to have a trade or profession, to procure food and clothing for himself and his family, which he is to watch over and protect, and also to have a portion of his time at the command of the public service.

What are the duties of a wife? To take care of the interior of the house, and to arrange

all matters connected with the domestic economy; to instruct the boys in the rudiments of learning, and to educate the girls entirely.

What are the principal virtues of Attachment? Society, Friendship, and Patrial love.

Is society, or the social state, an institution of nature? Man is nowhere found solitary; he is at least one of a family; families unite and form tribes, and these compose nations.

Can society, of itself, be said to produce virtues or vices? Society is the consequence of an innate primary faculty, and social virtues and social vices, as they are called, result from its combination with other fundamental powers. The institutions destined to direct mankind in their actions are and will continue to be the principal causes of their virtues and of their vices, so long as internal motives, sufficient to induce the practice of morality, independently of all enactments, shall not be experienced.

Is Patrial love commanded by natural morality? Natural morality recognizes no one species of exclusive love as a supreme law; love of native land is admitted, but still as subordinate to universal love. Patriality is an attribute of the animal nature, General Love of proper humanity alone.

Wherein lies the difference between Conjugal love, Family love, Fraternal love, and Patrial love? Each kind depends on the faculty of Attachment combined with other and different powers. Attachment with the sexual propensity begets conjugal love, with love of offspring family love; the love of a fraternity is based upon an attachment with success in particular views or plans, and the love of native country on an attachment extended to the land of our birth to its manners and mode of living, to the men speaking the same language, governed by the same laws as ourselves, &c.

What is the direction of Attachment which is conformable to natural morality, and consequently, positively virtuous? That which is bestowed on those who submit to the laws of the Creator.

And what direction of Attachment is vicious? That which is not given agreeable to natural morality.

Are there any positive codes that exact attachment in conformity with natural morality?

Yes; the Indian system of morals, and the code of Jesus command us to know as brothers and as sisters those only who do the will of God.

Is resistance of attack, or self-defence, permitted by natural morality? Courage is a primary faculty of human nature, and its proper employment a virtue. Such a power, in the order of things, was indispensable to individual preservation and well-being. It is a frequent means in procuring aliment, it enables us to overcome obstacles, and is even useful in maintaining peace.

Is personal courage assisted by muscular strength? So much so, that several philos-

phers have conceived it a result of this. Courage, however, is the appanage of no particular degree of muscularity or bodily power.

Is Courage in itself either Virtue or Vice? Ancient philosophers ranked it as one of the four cardinal Virtues, but in itself, Courage is neither Virtue nor Vice; one or other of these titles it gains according to its just or unjust employment.

When is Courage a Virtue? When it is displayed in conformity with natural morality.

And when is Courage a Vice? When it aids the animal nature against that which is peculiarly human.

What are the chief Vices of Courage? War of aggression; Quarrelsomeness; Love of fighting and of witnessing Combats between animals or men, Dispute, Contention, &c.

What employment of Courage deserves to be praised and rewarded? Such as favours natural morality is alone commendable, is alone worthy of reward.

What is the right which man possesses through his propensity to destroy? It is that of killing other animals for the sake of his flesh. Violent death is one of Nature's enactments, and man has that in his constitution which originates the law.

Has man a title to torment animals in any way whatever? No; his moral part forbids all cruel amusements, and all indulgence at the expense of suffering to any living and sentient being.

Has man a right to slay his fellow men? Only when he cannot otherwise defend his life, or if this be the sole means of preventing malefactors from committing murder.

Is capital punishment admissible in society? Society may agree to inflict death to get rid of evil-doers; but it is unjust and cruel to resort to such an extreme measure until every other means has been tried, and found ineffectual, to protect the community against criminals. Yet it is understood that this, as well as all other penalties, is to be applied universally, and without distinction of persons.

Does not man's peculiar part revolt at the idea, and natural morality command the abolition, of capital punishment? Man's ennobling and peculiar nature does only good; it never returns evil for evil, or takes revenge; it consequently commands the abolition of capital punishment. It is the animal nature, combined with the simple sense of justice, which has established the law of retaliation—the *lex talionis*. Man's proper nature may, however, lawfully employ the animal faculties to enforce and to assist natural morality, and capital punishment must be inflicted if with its abolition the number of crimes should increase.

Is the practice of Duelling permitted by the law of natural morality? Duelling is opposed to every one of its precepts. He who sheds blood in a duel is guilty of murder. The cus-

tom originated in the right of the strongest, and its continuance is one of the remains of barbarism.

Is war between nations agreeable to natural morality? He who, under any circumstances, attacks and puts another to death, commits a murder in the eye of God. All wars of conquest are utterly at variance with the moral law. Defensive war is alone lawful. Every nation, like every individual, has the undoubted right of repelling any other that would attempt to enslave it. It has even a right to destroy its enemies, if there be no other means of preserving its liberties and independent existence.

What are the good effects of the faculty of Constructiveness? This faculty is the source of the mechanical arts; its employment is virtuous when it adds to the means of subsistence, and favours the general welfare; for instance, when it procures a good dwelling-house, convenient articles of furniture, or clothing which does not impede the motions of the body, and which protects it from the inclemencies of the seasons, or the sudden variations of atmospheric temperature.

In what manner does the faculty of Constructiveness work evil? The mechanical arts are injurious to mankind by introducing luxury. Ordinary enjoyments then suffice no longer, and the desires are guided by caprice. To meet the many and expensive demands thus incurred, large sums of money are required, and to procure these, every means is adopted without scruple. Morals thus become corrupted, and a highway opened to all the miseries which attend degenerating men and declining empires. It was with justice that the ancient moralists founded the social virtues upon simplicity of manners, restriction of wants, and contentment with little.

In what does a just employment, or virtuous direction of the faculty of Acquisitiveness, consist? In procuring the necessities of life, or as the Christian code has styled it, 'our daily bread.'

Is property permitted by natural morality? Yes; for as all who live must subsist, all must have a right to that, at least, which is necessary to support life.

Is it agreeable or contrary to natural morality to amass great wealth? No one can accumulate riches without doing injury to his neighbour, and violence to the natural moral law, which says, 'love thy neighbour as thyself.' The moral law gives 'their daily bread' to all who employ the talents they possess, but it gives no more.

Does natural morality permit animals to be kept for the purpose merely of pleasure and extravagance? No. Inasmuch as man is more worthy than beasts, it is against natural law to give to horses and dogs the daily bread of men, or the provender which would feed cattle, whose flesh is both useful and necessary as aliment, to the human kind.

Which are the most useful classes in mankind? They are such as by their industry produce, or augment the value of things—agriculturists and artizans.

And what classes are the most useless? Such as do nothing but consume.

Does natural morality set limits to the gratification of the love of gain? Certainly it does. The love of gain is the most formidable of all enemies to the law of neighbourly love. Men brought up under the influence of the spirit of trade, generally endeavour by every means in their power to evade the commands of natural morality.

Does the natural moral law grant exclusive advantages to individuals under the form of privileges or monopolies? No; on the contrary, it commands every one to employ the talents entrusted to his care, for the advancement of the common good, the universal weal of man.

What are the privileges accounted the least blameable among good men? Such as are granted for inventions and useful discoveries.

Is it conformable to the law of natural morality to secure the eldest males of families in large possessions, to the exclusion of the other children? It is against every one of its precepts.

Is hereditary wealth favourable or prejudicial to the culture of morality? To amass great wealth is immoral; it is immoral to leave great riches to children. Man is naturally disposed to be idle, and commonly yields to the inclination, if not compelled to exertion. But idleness is a fertile source of immorality. It ruins the health, enervates the mind, and makes life a curse. Moses says well—'Man was born to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow.'

How do the rich usually apologize for their great possessions? They introduce God as the disposer of all things; they boast of being his favourites, and say, Providence gave them all they have.—Nevertheless they might be answered by a reference to the Christian code, where they will find themselves admonished to give their riches to the poor, in order more easily to enter the kingdom of heaven. There, too, they will learn, that the indulgence in superfluities, and hoarding of treasures, while thousands of their fellow-men are living around them in indigence, is utterly at variance with the express injunction to treat our neighbour as ourselves. The love of money, said the Apostle Paul to Timothy, is the root of all evil. This presumptuous error may be further exposed by recurring to the history of rich families. These have always degenerated in corporeal and mental qualities; their properties, if not secured by arbitrary laws, consequently pass away into other hands; and in fine, no living evidence of their ever having existed remains—their very name is consigned to oblivion.

Are we required by natural morality to labour and support the idler? Whilst it commands aid to the unfortunate and to the infirm,

who are unable by their own exertions to procure the means of existence, natural morality enjoins the rejection of the sluggard and the drone as unworthy. The Apostle Paul, in his second letter to the Thessalonians, iii. 10, said, 'when we were with you, this we commanded you, that if any would not work, neither should he eat.'

When we see that arts and sciences especially flourish when every one strives for his individual advantage, is it not likely, that, as this could not continue under the dominion of natural morality, all would droop beneath its reign? It were indeed no very agreeable reflection, for the industrious and the talented to think that they were labouring for the indolent and incapable. Meantime, however, they should also remember, that they have no natural title, on the strength of a patent or charter of privilege, to deprive others of the opportunity to earn a livelihood, and much less, on account of their superior endowments, to make others labour for their peculiar advantage.

But has not he who contrives or procures work for others a natural right to gain more than they? The civil law says yes, but the Christian and natural moral codes recognize no such privilege. As we live in the world at present, the laws should apportion to each person who labours, his share of the profit, according to his talents, industry, and care. This would be necessary, so long as selfishness predominates to its present extent. Legislators should favour the working classes as much as possible, and use every means of rendering the reign of natural morality practical.

Is it possible to do away with all sense of individual property? To attempt such a thing with men as they are now constituted, would be to annihilate even the hope of general happiness. It would cause crimes and calamities of every description. The certainty of this exists in the evidently immoral disposition of by far the greatest portion of mankind, and in the general prevalence of cupidity, and in the distribution of talents. To accomplish the beneficial abolition of private property, every individual ought to feel pleasure in acting according to the commands of the natural and Christian moral doctrines. Until then, property must be respected. The early Christians attempted the measure of abolition; all things were in common among them; but experience proved that mankind were not then in a condition to adopt such a system; and they are still at an infinite distance from the perfection which might render it practicable. When, when will men be able to obey the law of universal love!

May natural morality, to a certain extent, be united with the existence of individual possessions? Yes; by fixing the maximum of property, and the conditions under which this may lawfully be acquired. The general wel-

fare is always to be taken as the foundation in such considerations. Manufacturers should be obliged to lay out part of their gains in bettering the condition, and adding to the comforts, of their labourers,—above all, they ought to be prevented from injuring the health and morals of those in their employment.

Does natural morality set bounds to national, as well as to individual, love of gain? Nations, which enrich themselves to the detriment of others, act contrary to the laws of morality. The natural and christian doctrines place Universal above Patrial love. That people which prevents the participation of its neighbours in the advantages it enjoys, though it may arrogate the title is no christian nation.

Are Sumptuary laws just or necessary? Did manufacturers, and the inhabitants of every country, love their neighbours as themselves, sumptuary laws would be useless, no one, then, would wish to enrich himself in particular, the products of every land would be freely exchanged, and manufactures carried on and perfected wherever it could be done most advantageously. In brief, the universal good would be the sole consideration, and the efforts of all be directed to the accomplishment of this great end.

Prohibitory laws in general, are not, however, sufficient to establish natural morality; are they? No. They may, in some measure, prevent the evils which result from the over activity of the inferior inclinations; but to better the lot of man, it would be necessary to diminish his animality, and to increase the energy of his peculiar humanity.

What are the Vices of the desire to acquire? Usury, Fraud, Gambling, and Theft in general.

Has the word Theft the same meaning in the civil as in the natural code? Natural morality declares many actions to be Thefts which are permitted by civil laws. Every one according to the first, deserves the name of Thief, who does not love his neighbour as himself; he, for instance, who amasses wealth by means of the industry of others. In the eye of civil laws, however, he only is a Thief who takes, by force or fraud, aught that, agreeably to the law, belongs to another.

Is Theft, in the sense of the civil law, forbidden by Christianity? Yes; the Christian doctrine forbids evil of every kind.

Does it go farther? Much: it not only forbids evil, it in addition commands universal love, and in this it harmonizes with natural morality. 'They who came before me,' said Jesus, 'were thieves.' He desired us to be satisfied with our daily bread.

What are the Virtues, and what the Vices, of the Propensity to conceal (Secretiveness)? The faculty is Virtuous when employed in the cause of general welfare, and Vicious when it gives rise to lying, hypocrisy, cunning, intrigue, and duplicity.

What are the Virtues of Cautiousness? Prudence, doubt, and just timidity.

And its Vices? Irresolution, puerile terror, melancholy and despair.

Is Prudence necessary in teaching truth? The light that is shed, ought certainly to be apportioned to the capacity of bearing it in those who are the subjects of instruction. Jesus mentioned that he had yet many things to say which his disciples could not bear. 'There is nothing covered that shall not be revealed, and hid that shall not be known;' Matth. x. 26. He taught them in parables concerning the kingdom of heaven, but added: 'what I tell you in darkness that speak ye in light; and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops;' Matth. x. 27.

What are the Virtues and the Vices of Self-esteem? True dignity and nobleness of character depend in part on self-esteem, and the faculty is virtuously employed in the production of such an effect. But self-sufficiency, pride, haughtiness, and disdainful or contemptuous bearing, are consequences of its over activity and ill direction. Coarseness of manners, too, under certain circumstances, and impertinence, are increased by self-esteem.

What is the signification of the word Humility? It is synonymous with the inaction of self-esteem. Humility, to be a virtue, must result from the struggle between self-esteem and the moral sentiments, and the victory of the latter. Humility is also occasionally used to signify activity in the Sentiment of Respectfulness (Reverence).

Is Self-esteem a necessary quality? Yes; it favours general independence. Submissiveness on the part of one, encourages pride and the love of dominion in another. Self-esteem should adjust the balance between the ideas of our own, and of others' importance. Its virtuous functions emanate from its combinations with the faculties proper to man.

What Virtues and what Vices belong to the faculty of Love of Approbation? This sentiment contributes essentially to the union of mankind; politeness of deportment and delicacy in language, deference in society, obligingness of manner, and good breeding generally, are among its agreeable manifestations. But pettishness, vanity, ostentation, ambition, love of titles, and of all kinds of mundane distinctions, are consequences of its ill directed activity.

Is it easier or difficult to guide Self-esteem and Love of Approbation in the path indicated by natural morality? It is extremely difficult. 'To fly the age we live in,' says Confucius,* 'to suffer without repining, to pass unknown and unnoticed among men, is a task to be accomplished only by a saint.' The great energy of these two sentiments, strengthened as they are by the love of gain, and the inferior inclinations generally, occasion innumerable

* Invariable Millieu. Chap. xi.

evils in the world, and excite doubts of the possibility of natural morality ever being established as the rule of conduct. The Christian law declares itself, in terms which cannot be more positive or more severe, against abuses of Self-esteem and Love of Approbation, nevertheless, they who style themselves believers, and the faithful, par excellence, even the preachers of the doctrine of Jesus, have continued, and still continue, as well as pagans, to be delighted with the gratifications these faculties afford, and to attribute to the Supreme Being tastes and weaknesses similar to their own.

What are the Virtues of Benevolence? Meekness, the Spirit of peace, Clemency, Toleration, Liberality, Forgivingness of Temper, Hospitality, Equity, and Neighbourly Love.

Is christian charity a single faculty? No; it embraces the whole of the moral law, and the regulation of every action that concerns our fellow-men.

Is Alms-giving a Virtue? It is a Virtue or it is a Vice according as the general happiness is thereby affected. If it encourage idleness, society suffers, and it is evidently blamable. When the truly deserving are its objects, and it is directed to purposes generally useful, it is conformable to natural morality, and is praiseworthy. Indiscriminate charity is never to be recommended.

Can Benevolence be any way injurious to mankind? Immensely. If not directed by reason combined with the sentiment of Justice, it may encourage slothfulness and poverty, and all the vices that attend on these. It may also dispose to prodigality and squandering.

Is Respectfulness a natural Virtue? Yes; nature has implanted a primary sentiment, its cause, in the constitution of man.

What objects especially deserve the respect of man? The Supreme Cause, Parents, those who teach the laws of the Creator, those who watch over their accomplishment, and, in general, all that is benevolent, just, and true.

May respect ever be ill-directed? It is but too frequently bestowed altogether unworthily upon superstitious notions and observances, and upon antiquated forms, usages, and precedents.

This sentiment then requires guidance in its application? Certainly; and reason ought especially to rectify the errors it has committed in regard to religion. All the sentiments, without exception, are blind, and require the aid of intelligence in their operation; without it they can never act in harmony with the whole of the nature of man.

But does not belief suffice to direct the religious sentiments? No; for religious belief has induced men to admit the most contradictory and many noxious propositions, under the idea that we ought to obey God rather than man; moreover, that which belief leads one to style venerable and holy, is often, by another, called absurd and impious.

The religious sentiments are given to man as sources of happiness, are they not? That they are given to produce good is evident; they are the gift of a good God, but hitherto they have been cruelly abused.

What course would most directly tend to abolish the errors, and, for the future, to avoid the disorders, which have been committed in the name of religion? It would be necessary to begin by permitting the free use of reason. This, too, would be the first step towards effecting the union of all religious people. As yet the blind lead the blind, but reason ought to enlighten and direct the religious, as well as other primitive feelings.

Is belief natural to man? Few examine and combine their ideas. The greater number admit what they like best, or what flatters their feelings and senses most. They who hope for much, willingly believe promises made to them in the name of heaven. They who are inclined to admire and to seek after the marvellous, readily give credit to aught that seems mysterious. And they who combine the sentiment of respectfulness, with the two that produce these effects, are fit agents for the execution of whatever they are told is necessary to the glory of God.

Is the believing and benevolent man every thing we expect of humanity? No; he may be still unfurnished with many very essential qualities, such as Justice—the fountain-head of morality, Reason—the sole guide of action, and Perseverance, the indispensable assistant in the task of completion.

Does the sentiment of conscientiousness of itself suffice to prevent injustice? It does not. This sentiment, it is true, feels the desire of acting justly; but it is blind, and must be enlightened by reason, before its actions can be recognised as just. It is Reason, therefore, that declares every thing done in conformity with the dictates of the faculties peculiar to man to be just, and every thing contrary to their commands to be unjust.

Is natural morality the same as positive justice? The natural and the christian moral codes agree, but they both differ from the civil laws. These last only forbid the doing of things to others which we would not that they did to us; whilst the natural and christian morality, far more noble, command the doing to others the things which we would that they did to us.

Can the sentiment of conscientiousness do harm? Yes; by acting uncombined with Reason, and those powers generally which are peculiar to man.

What Virtues and what Vices, belong to the faculty of Firmness or Perseverance? Perseverance in whatever is true, just, and reasonable, is Virtuous; but to persist in what is false, unjust, and unreasonable, is Vicious.

Is man generally, as he is now constituted, capable of accomplishing the precepts of natural morality? No; neither the governors nor the

governed are generally susceptible of such superlative virtue. All that good men can do at present, is to demonstrate the existence of the system of natural morality, to submit to it, and to spread abroad its knowledge; to examine into the obstacles which oppose its admission; and to propose the means necessary to prepare mankind for the happy epoch, when they will be capable of enjoying the blessings it must diffuse, by being made the rule of action.

Is the cultivation of the Understanding to be regarded as a duty? Intelligence is one of nature's gifts; it is therefore destined to act. Our existence, indeed, depends on it. Without understanding we should know neither external objects and their qualities, nor the laws which govern the physical and moral world; neither could we have any moral liberty.

Is understanding recognised as necessary to free will? Yes; according to all the systems of legislation, idiots, and children before a certain age, are not accountable for their actions, because they are unable to distinguish between good and evil.

Are the functions of the intellectual faculties Virtuous or Vicious? They may be either. Intelligence is a means of doing both good and evil. To be Virtuous it must second natural morality, which is the end of our being.

What is the vice or sin against Intelligence? It is ignorance, the cause of a great number of evils. Ignorance commits endless errors; it acts unconscious of causes and of effects, and can never repair the disasters it occasions.

Is man's ignorance great? It is exceedingly great. The most common and necessary things are totally unknown to the bulk of mankind.

Why is man's ignorance so great? The cause lies in the generally small size of the organs of his intellectual faculties. This is also the reason why study is so commonly irksome and distasteful. Moreover, the civil, and especially the religious, governors of nations, have frequently opposed every sort of obstacle to the cultivation of intellect, and the diffusion of knowledge.

What difference is there between Ignorance and presumptuous Stupidity, (sottise in French)? Ignorance is compatible with the presence of excellent natural capacities; presumptuous stupidity depends on deficiency of the intellectual powers, joined to self-esteem and pretensions to learning.

Is Ignorance despicable? Not in itself; and provided every opportunity of gaining information and exercising the mental powers be laid hold on.

Is it the same in regard to presumptuous Stupidity? No. This is despised by every sensible person, for it invariably leads men to neglect the means of instruction.

What is the difference between a learned and a wise man? Every man who knows much is learned: but he only is wise who has acquired practical knowledge; that is, knowledge ap-

plicable in the affairs of life. The wise man also endeavours to account for what he observes, and to discover principles, in conformity with which he may constantly act.

Is it necessary, for the sake of morality, to cultivate the Understanding? Although neither the religious nor the moral sentiments spring from understanding, they still require its guidance in their application, and its aid in enabling them to act harmoniously with all the other faculties of human nature.

What should be the aim of every description of study? The establishment of Truth and attainment of Perfection. 'Truth,' says Confucius, 'is the law of Heaven,' and 'Perfection is the beginning and the end of all things.'

What is the basis on which the perfecting of mankind must proceed? Knowledge of human nature, and submission to the laws of the Creator;—conviction that nothing can be created, but only modified and reproduced according to determinate conditions.

How might the adoption of the natural laws, as the rule of conduct, be most speedily effected? By governments exacting their practice, and joining the authority of example, by obeying their commands.

What are the essential requisites in a legislator? He ought to know the nature of the being for whom he enacts laws, to believe in natural morality, and to attest his belief by his actions.

Have men any right mutually to impose their wills as rules of moral conduct? They most certainly have not. There is but one will that ought to be done—the Will of God, and this, in morality, commands imperiously to man, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.'

May the doctrine of Morality become a science? There can be no doubt it may by studying the laws of the Creator, and by comparing them with pure Christianity.

CHAPTER II.

OF RELIGION.

I. OF RELIGION IN GENERAL.

Has every one a right to inquire into religious matters? It seems absurd that a particular profession should enjoy the privilege to establish religious opinions incumbent on all the rest of the community, whilst it seems right that every reasonable mind should examine the most important, viz., the religious part of his constitution.

Has the phrenologist in particular a right to inquire into religion? Undoubtedly. Phrenology embraces the whole of the innate dispositions. Now as there are innate religious feelings, the phrenologist is enabled to examine their essence and operations.

What are the limits of the phrenologist in the examination of religious conceptions? He is confined to the result of the innate religious feelings of man.

What is the meaning of the word Religion? This name comes from the Latin, and signifies a binding together, connexion, or union. We particularly understand by it a belief in supernatural beings, and in relations between them and ourselves; and further, the practice of rendering them worship, in whatever this is made to consist—in whatever manner it is bestowed.

Have men universally had Religion of some description? All nations whatsoever have conceived the existence of supernatural powers, have believed themselves in relation with these, and have adored them, although in very different manners.

How may Religions be divided? According to the number of supernatural beings revered, and according to the origin of religious ideas.

What religious systems are included in that division which regards the number of divinities?

1st, Polytheism,—the system of belief in many gods; such was the Pagan Religion, styled Mythology. 2d, Bithicism,—the system of belief in two principles, the one of good, the other of evil, named Osiris and Typhon by the Egyptians; Brama and Moisaour by the Indians; Ormuzd and Ahrimanes by the Persians; Jehovah and Satan by the Jews; God and the Devil by some modern nations, &c. 3d, Monotheism,—the system of belief in one Supreme Being, the primary cause of all that is, and all that comes to pass.

Can we conceive the origin of Polytheism?

Yes; by keeping in view the nature of the faculties possessed by man, and his great ignorance. By his innate dispositions man is inclined to venerate, to fear, to admire, and to raise his mind to supernatural conceptions. These feelings he at first employed upon natural objects, the sun, the moon, the stars, and afterwards upon the personified causes of natural phenomena, as of thunder, of the wind, of the four seasons, of vegetation, &c. In his ignorance, therefore, man followed the blind dictates of his feelings, and espoused such opinions as accorded with them.

Can we also conceive the system of two principles, the one of good, the other of evil? Yes; for good and evil, or pleasure and pain, exist. Nature universally presents opposites to the view, and every individual even feels these in his own interior, among his sentiments. Now man, who by one faculty seeks for the cause of every effect, and by another personifies every thing even to causes, could not admit one and the same cause for both good and evil.

Is Monotheism, or the system of one Supreme Being, more reasonable than Polytheism and the belief in two principles? Belief in the unity of God is the only notion that agrees with the supreme law of reason. This belief, therefore, spreads abroad among the nations, in proportion as they become enlightened.

Which of the two, Monotheism or Polytheism, was most probably the first religious belief

among savage nations? Polytheism. To arrive at Monotheism, it is necessary to reason; but the feelings or affective faculties exist in greater activity than the powers of analysis and causation in civilized, and still more among savage nations. It is consequently probable, that the religious sentiments acted before the intellectual faculties had received any cultivation, and in their blindness gave birth to the absurdities of paganism. This is the course in which the people, whose histories we know, have advanced, during the different epochs of their civilization, and it has probably been that of those nations, of whose origin or infant existence no account has reached us.

Is general consent given to the above reply?

No; Monotheism is commonly believed to have degenerated into Polytheism, by reason of the symbols under which the Supreme Being and his attributes were adored. To God, it is said, were attributed the light and vivifying power of the sun, the abundance of a fertile country, &c.—the presumed qualities of the Deity were represented under particular forms or likened to natural objects; and ignorance, overlooking their emblematic sense assumed the mere Symbols as Divinities.

How is the preceding reasoning supported?

Monotheism, it is asserted, reigned in the east of Asia, whilst in the western world,—in Egypt, Greece, and Italy, the symbols of God having been taken for so many divinities, Polytheism was the religious belief.

What is overlooked in this explanation of Polytheism? The primary dispositions of man, and their spontaneous activity. Our ignorance, too, of the early history of eastern nations is forgotten. It is also extremely improbable that they alone should have commenced by Monotheism, all the other societies of Europe, of America, and the Isles, having followed a different course.

How have the Monotheists represented God?

Philosophers have conceived God as a Supreme, Self-existing, and Self-sufficing Being, the Author and Preserver of the Universe.

What is the title of the doctrine which recognizes the existence of a supreme, maintaining, and great First Cause? It is called Deism, as its supporters are styled Deists or Theists. Some philosophers, however, have considered God as a vivifying and moving principle, pervading all things. This they have called Soul of the World. According to them, the souls of men are portions of, or emanations from, the great principle, which are never lost, but quitting one body at death go immediately to animate another.

What is the exact meaning of Atheism? It signifies the doctrine which denies the existence of a God,—Supreme Creator and Upholder of the Universe.*

* 'The fool saith in his heart, There is no God,' Psalm xiv. 1.

How may Atheism be accounted for? Atheists must necessarily be very rare. They can only exist in consequence of some deficiency in the conditions, by means of which man generally conceives a Supreme Being; in the same way as one is blind from birth when the apparatus on which vision depends is imperfect.

What religious systems are included in the division according to the origin of religious ideas? 1st, Natural Religion, and, 2d, Revealed Religion.

II. OF NATURAL RELIGION.

Does man, by his reason, recognise the existence of God? Man involuntarily seeks for the Workman, or Cause of all that is. By reasoning he arrives at a First Cause, beyond which he can conceive nothing; this cause personified is God.

Can man, by his reason, comprehend the nature of God? No; to know God, it were necessary to be his equal at the least; an inferior being can never conceive the nature of one infinitely his superior. Indeed, man does not know the essence of any single natural object; how then can he imagine that of aught which is supernatural?

Is man naturally inclined to religious ideas? There is nothing more certain. He has innate faculties, whose manifestations depend on certain parts of the brain, and which induce him to be religious.

Can religious ideas be indifferent in their nature? True religion being the will of God, cannot be indifferent, and God being all perfection and bounty cannot act from mere arbitrariness.

Is it probable that God, in giving a law to man, has given him also means to understand it? Certainly, since without intellect neither the law nor its necessity can be conceived.

Does natural religion admit of reasoning? Its regulation is subjected to reason. Any proposition subversive of universal harmony among the faculties is at once to be rejected as erroneous.

Is not the reason of man governed by certain principles, agreeably to which it must admit or deny such and such attributes or qualities in God? Human reason ought at least to suppose all the moral qualities in God, which it exacts of a just and reasonable man.

Can God, agreeably to human reason, be in contradiction with himself, improve by experience, do aught at one time, and repent him of having done so at a latter period? No; according to human reason, God is perfection and intelligence itself; his will is eternal, and his laws are unchangeable.

Can God be partial? Human reason says he is all equity and all justice; it declares every exclusionary idea entertained in connexion with the Parent of the Universe, as sacrilegious.

Can God be cruel? Good sense shrinks

from such a conception coupled with the name of the great Author of all. God cannot love evil, nor lend it his countenance and aid.

Can God be jealous, envious, and vindictive? All such expressions are merely expedient, and adapted to a hard-hearted race of men. Belief in God combined with such ideas, is an abomination in the eyes of a rational and moral being.

Why has God been so generally represented as a being to be feared? Because fear is an excellent means of making man act at will.

Is it probable that the divine laws made for man are adapted to his nature? It is impossible to think that God, in creating man, and instituting laws for his government, did not adjust the one to the other.

God being unchangeable, must, therefore, religion not remain unchanged? The design and end of religion must remain unchanged, but the means tending to that end must vary according to the different degree of civilization of nations and individuals who receive religious instruction.

What can be the end of true religion? The glory of God and the good of man.

Can divine laws be less reasonable than civil laws? This is impossible, because human wisdom coming from God, cannot surpass that of his all-wise Creator and perfect law-giver.

Which are the powers of man that are proper to judge of true religious notions? Religion is a prerogative of man; hence, all religious notions should be in conformity with the human faculties strictly speaking, and free from every influence of animal feelings.

Is every one capable of deciding about religious truth? No more than every person is able to judge of arts and sciences. The great bulk of mankind is only fit to learn; happy, therefore, the flock, under the shepherd who attends to their welfare.

Are there some signs indicating of truth in religion? Since true religion tends to the glory of God and the good of man, divine doctrines are harmonious, reasonable, and have a powerful influence to improve man's life and moral character, whilst all contradictions, absurdities and doctrines that tend to promote vice, cannot come from above.

Is it reasonable to conceive God, trying men and their obedience by commanding insignificant and unmeaning observances, useless both to himself and to his creatures? Such a thought is altogether unworthy of the true God. The idea of God spreading toils for man is incompatible with his divine justice. A reasonable master commands no more than the necessary, the profitable, and the just, to his servants. And if God be prescient, as reason proclaims, he cannot require to put mankind to the proof. It is time to cease from representing God as a mere human being; or if this be indeed impossible, let us suppose the Supreme Author of the universe at least endowed with such qualities as are exacted from tolerably

perfect humanity—Benevolence, Justice, Reason. The will of God implicates realities and things indispensable ; instead therefore of attributing to the Creator childish fantasies and modes of acting to which worse names might with justice be applied, let us accomplish his natural laws, fulfil the duties that profit ourselves and all mankind, and thus, if by aught, we may render ourselves agreeable to the great Author of our being.

Is the belief which men have in God's attributes, of great importance ? Of the greatest ; since men like to imitate the example of their Maker.

Is outward worship conceivable in Natural Religion ? In recognizing supernatural agents, or one Supreme Being, and their influence on his estate, man was naturally led to render them homage, and to demand their protection. Farther, in endowing the objects of his worship with human qualities, often with human weaknesses, and even with human vices, man has treated them humanly ; he has assigned them abodes, especially in elevated situations, he has erected altars to their service, and brought them propitiatory offerings of various kinds ; he has sung them laudatory hymns, played on musical instruments, and burnt perfumes for their gratification, &c., &c. Man has always anthropomorphised the divinity he adored.

Was it also natural for man to imagine agents intermediate between him and his Creator ? Yes ; in representing God as endowed with human faculties, men have deemed him accessible to all their wants, as well as alive to all their pleasures and appetites. They consequently supposed that the Supreme Being, like an earthly potentate, held a court, and had a ministry or administration, to which he confided part of his affairs, that he had favourites to whom his ear was more open than to themselves, and so on, after the manner of things below.

In Natural Religion what is the worship which reason approves ? Reason says that God, being all perfection in himself, can neither gain nor lose in beatitude by means of the terrestrial creation. Reason says further, that God must be a spirit, not shut up in one place, but that the earth—the universe—is his tabernacle. Moreover, reason says that God created men for their own happiness, and that having established the laws necessary to secure this end, they are the true bond of union between God and man. Knowledge of the natural laws, therefore, and unreserved submission to their dictates, compose the natural worship which man owes and must render to make himself agreeable to the Deity.

Is there any difference between Natural Religion and Natural Morality ? None whatever. All the relation which man, during the term of this life, has with God or his Creator, consists in respect and obedience to His laws.

III. OF REVEALED RELIGION.

Man is by his nature carried to religious ideas ; but there is another source which invites to such conception, is there not ? Yes, it is Revelation.

Is this source fertile in results ? Yes ; by far the greater number of religious systems have been received as revelations. The divinities of the ancients, and the Deity, by whatever title designated, of the moderns, are reputed to have manifested their Will, whether directly or indirectly, to man. Judges in Israel, Druids among the Celts, Incas among the Peruvians,—in a word, a priesthood have always been the interpreters of the celestial decrees. This body commonly received the instructions of heaven secretly, or in symbolic language ; and appropriating to itself the right of interpreting them, it has ever taught dogmatically, arrogated infallibility to its tribunal, and anathematized whoever dared to contradict, to question, or to doubt.

Is Reason opposed to the belief in Revelation ? No ; Reason is obliged to admit a Creator, and cannot limit his almighty power.

Do all the systems of religion received as revealed, and which admit one only God, invariably represent him in the same way ? No ; some of them attribute physical qualities to the Supreme Being ; the Mahometans, for instance, conceive him to be round, immense, and cold ; the Indian Gentiles, imagine him as an oval ; others picture him as an old man with a white beard and a venerable aspect, &c. Those systems of Religion which accord most with Reason, speak of God as an incorporeal Being—a Spirit.

And do all the religions that recognize God as a Spirit, conceive him endowed with similar attributes ? Far from it ; by one he is represented as partial, exclusive, jealous, vindictive, cruel, a God of armies and battles, delighting in the blood of victims and of enemies ; by another he is pictured full of goodness, beneficence, clemency, and mercy, a God of peace and of love, rejoicing in the felicity of all.—Men commonly attribute to the Supreme Being their own manners of thinking and of feeling their animal and human nature ;—this is even apparent in the interpretations of the several grand systems of religion, i. e. in the formation of sects. The controversies of theologians on God and his nature, on his communication with man, and on the mode in which he rules the universe, are very voluminous, and there are innumerable schools of religion, each of which assigns grounds, more or less plausible, for its dissent from the others ; in general, however, they are evidently entangled in a labyrinth of contradiction and inconsequence.

Are there not some general points of resemblance between all systems of religion ? There are. 1st, In each the articles of belief are propounded as the commands of heaven.

2d, The articles of faith are essentially the same, but variously modified according to the genius of each; they relate to a beginning, or creation of the world, to one or more regulating causes of occurring phenomena, to a primary state of perfection of man as created by a good principle, to his degeneration, or fall through disobedience, to a cause of his seduction, to his disgrace and punishment, to the possibility of his repurification and restoration to divine favour, and lastly, to his future state. 3d, They who made known the articles of a revelation, have uniformly attested their mission by the working of miracles; these are the testimonials of prophets. 4th, The language used in all is figurative, or symbolical. 5th, Almost all are intolerant and mutually exclusive; a circumstance which arises from the innate feelings of self-esteem and firmness in man, and from its being evident, that as there is only one God, only one religion can possibly be true.

Whence does this sameness arise? It may be accounted for by the sameness of the innate powers, and by inferring a primitive revelation of the divine will, adapted to the innate faculties of man, which being essentially the same, necessarily require and determine similar modes of satisfaction. All nations have music according to the same laws, and dances in accordance with their music; pride is everywhere greedy of command, and vanity of display. The same invariable law applies to religious sentiments in combination with the other primary powers of the mind.

When we see that the several faculties which dispose men to be religious are innate, does not revelation become superfluous? By no means. All the natural inclinations have gone astray, and have a continual tendency to err in their application, and revelation, in giving them a good positive direction, may be eminently salutary.

Are all the religious systems, which are considered as revealed, and believed at the same time, true? This is impossible. As there is but one God, there can be but one supreme will, and one true religion.

Has the phrenologist a right, or is it incumbent upon him, to decide about the truth of any religious belief? Neither the one, nor the other. His knowledge is confined to the results of the innate dispositions, but the certainty of revelation depends on proofs of another nature beyond the reach of phrenology.

How are the religions, regarded by their disciples as revealed, commonly supported? It is customary to repose on the veracity of the prophets who report the revelation, and they themselves are required to work miracles in order to attest their mission.

What is a miracle? A miracle is a suspension or counteraction of the established laws of nature. It, therefore, implies the power of God,—the ability to create, and to

interrupt or suspend the current of things, to annihilate, to diminish, and to augment matter, to still the waves of the sea, to hush the winds, to cure distempers by words, and so on.

Can the title 'absurd' ever be well applied in connexion with miracles? No; for whatever man pretends to effect, in contradiction to the laws of creation, is deception. Thus it is impossible to put the moon into the sleeve of a coat, as Mahomet boasted he had done.

Why have revelations always been made in symbolic and mysterious language? The majority of mankind are fond of the marvellous; and in addressing them through its medium, a hearing is surely and readily obtained. The most palpable absurdities, the grossest superstitions, are admitted by the ignorant, provided they be but proposed as supernatural, and be deeply tinged with the marvellous. Enlightened men, too, who formed just and reasonable ideas of the Supreme Being, of his attributes, and of man's relations with him, have generally been obliged to conform in public to the prevalent state-system of religion, and they therefore invented a language of symbols, by means of which they maintained their private opinions, entrusting the initiated only with the key to its interpretation. Besides, the oriental tongues abound in metaphors, comparisons, and figurative expressions, which, translated literally into modern languages, lose entirely their primary significations.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing reply? That we are not to rest satisfied with mere literal interpretations of religious language, but that we must search for its spirit. The apostle said long ago, 'the letter kills, but the spirit vivifies.'

Can a truly divine revelation interdict the use of reason? Reason is the noble gift by which the Creator has distinguished man from all other animated things. Now it would be a most unreasonable act, first to endow a being with any faculty, and then to prohibit its use. Such a procedure would be, if possible, more absurd in reference to the most distinguished and ennobling of all the powers of the mind. Moreover, God, who is all wisdom and all reason, could never create man in his own likeness, as it is said he did, and then forbid the employment of the very faculties which must form a principal feature in the resemblance.

Can God contradict himself? This is impossible, his will being perfection of virtue, and his sense of right and consistency being the strongest. God therefore cannot contradict in revelation what he teaches in his works; nor can he contradict in one part of scripture what he teaches at another.

What inference may be drawn from the preceding answer? Known truth derived from observation and experience must restrain and modify the scriptural language, and every interpretation must be given up which contradicts

any physical truth, particularly since the scriptural language is singularly figurative, and nowhere affects the precision of science or the accuracy of definition.

Is belief the best means of proving the truth of a revealed system of religion? It is certain that all religions whatsoever are propped upon belief. It is equally certain that belief depends on feelings rather than on intellect, and that men are very ready to believe when their tastes are flattered, when they are met by promises that are agreeable to their desires.—There are nearly as many Mahometans as Christians in the world, and all good Mussulmen believe, firmly, that their prophet put the moon into the sleeve of his coat. From this it is evident, that simple belief cannot demonstrate the truth of any, however generally accredited, system of religion.

Besides belief, is there any other mode of demonstrating the truth of a revelation? Yes; there are proofs founded on the nature of the revealed doctrine itself, and that are approved by reason. Thus, the precepts that come from God must necessarily harmonize, they must be adapted to human nature, and they must produce salutary effects. It is impossible to suppose that God gives mankind laws whose tendency is injurious to them.

Can true religion exclude morality? This seems impossible to those who have arrived at refined notions of an all-perfect Being, and who place their most acceptable worship in actions producing every one's own happiness in harmony with that of his neighbour. They find religion unprofitable, nay, often hurtful, if it be confined to mere belief in the divine appointment of prophets; in mere miraculous actions of the Almighty, or in idle, useless, ridiculous or even mischievous observances, whilst the exertions of the higher sentiments of man are passed over as indifferent.

Can they be received as true prophets, who speak according to the circumstances of the times in which they appear? No; the Spirit of God is eternally the same. Reason, therefore, unmasks Mahomet, who accommodated the revelations of the angel Gabriel to the nature of his designs, and even reseeded preceding communications entirely, if his views required the measure.

Is it reasonable to doubt in religious matters? and if so, why? Yes, it is; because many assent to what many deny; and because there have been many prophesying cheats, and much prophetic deception inflicted on the world. Caution is especially necessary when the temporal interest of the deceivers is joined with the spiritual interest of the deceived.

May false prophets and their errors be more readily and certainly detected by the nature of the doctrine they teach, or by the belief they receive? The nature and doctrine, and the fruits it produces, afford the surest test of its truth.

Why do the priesthood so commonly oppose the use of reason? The priesthood have exacted blind belief, because this, whilst it prevents discussion, renders their calling more imposing, and more easy; it further secures them from accusation, and eludes their errors and selfish views.

What advantage is there in proposing laws to men as divine revelations? It disposes them powerfully to obedience.

What peculiar condition of mankind is the most favourable to belief in general? The state of ignorance which is always credulous. They, therefore, who would lead the nations blindfolded, have reason at least on their side, in opposing the cultivation of the understanding.

Is it a matter of difficulty to discover and to understand truth? The question is rarely of either discriminating or of understanding; the mass of mankind admit what they like, and what they consider as favourable to their interests, whether temporal or eternal. When the time comes that mankind shall desire to understand and to practise what is reasonable and just, truth will triumph over error.

Is belief necessary in any wise? Yes; but if religious doctrines be imposed as obligatory, the articles of belief should be reasonable and just, in order that he who is capable of reflecting may perceive them as true, and their practices tending to establish the general happiness.

Is a religious doctrine true because of its promising great rewards? To promise largely is an efficient means of ensuring its adoption, but this does not in any way prove its truth. It ought to be reasonable and advantageous at the same time; that is to say, it should satisfy both the affective and the intellectual faculties of man.

Is instruction dangerous to morality? Experience proves most amply that it is not. The history of nations, of tribes, and of classes in the different societies of men, presents the greatest number of crimes and of immoral actions generally, during the reign of ignorance, and of superstition, its attendant. Crimes diminish not only in frequency, but in atrocity, in proportion as the mind receives cultivation, as arts and sciences are encouraged, and as good manners and gentle bearing are esteemed and rewarded. Men must positively be taught whatever it is deemed of importance that they should know. The only question therefore is, whether it be more advantageous to instruct them in superstition and error, or in reasonable religion and salutary truths.

Have religious doctrines done harm to mankind? Much, both physically and morally; sometimes by their commands, but principally by their intolerance.

How can a religious system work physical evil? By its provisions as to the nourishment of the body and the propagation of the species, and by countenancing any species of persecution, such as the rack, dungeon, stake, &c., &c.

What is the revealed religion which surpasses all others in every kind of perfection, and that stands the scrutiny of reason? It is Pure Christianity.

IV. OF CHRISTIANITY.

Phrenology being true, can it be in opposition to pure Christianity? This is impossible, as no truth either physical or moral can be in opposition to any other. Christianity and Phrenology, when well understood, will give mutual assistance to each other.

Is the phrenologist entitled to speak of Christianity, and if so, how far? The phrenologist has the right to examine whether Christianity is adapted to the innate dispositions of man, and he is delighted in seeing it in perfect harmony with the human nature. But he is confined to the examen of the Christian doctrine in itself and its superiority without being able to decide about the nature of the Revealer; he can speak only from actual observations and inductions.

Does the Christian Religion permit reasoning? Jesus himself said, 'Those who have ears let them hear;' he declared that light is not made to be hidden, but to enlighten; and he reproached his own disciples for being without understanding. (Matt. xv.) Paul also says, 'I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say.' (1 Cor. x. 15.) And again, 'Prove all things, hold fast that which is good.' (1 Thess. v. 21.) 'Beloved,' says John, 'Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God.' (1 John iv. 1.)

Does not Christianity recur to reasoning in order to demonstrate the existence of God? It does. For 'every house,' says Paul to the Hebrews, chap. iii. ver. 4, 'has been builded by some man, but he that built all things is God.'

In what manner, according to Christianity, does God make himself manifest? The invisible perfections of God, his eternal power and his divinity, appear in the works of creation. (Rom. i. 20.)

What are the chief attributes of God, as defined by Christianity? God is a spirit. (John iv. 24.) He is love. (1 John iv. 16.) He is just and impartial, and regards not appearances nor persons. (Rom. ii. 11.) He rewards each according to his works (Rom. ii.); desires only good, and wills only the happiness of his creatures. (New Testament, *passim*)

How may the doctrines of Christianity be divided? Into two principal parts—the one marvellous, the other moral.

In what does the marvellous part of Christianity consist? It includes whatever is incomprehensible, whatever is beyond the limits of observation;—such is the nature of God, the creation of the world by his will, his influence upon his creatures, his communication with men, the birth and miraculous actions of Jesus, the immortality of the soul, and the rewards and punishments in the life to come.

This part of Christianity requires belief? It depends entirely upon belief; for the points of which it is composed cannot be submitted to present observation.

How does belief in these incomprehensible matters become efficacious and profitable? When it induces the believer to practise the Christian virtues. It is necessary, says Paul, to have 'faith which worketh by love.' (Gal. v. 6.) 'Faith,' says James, 'if it have not works, is dead in itself.' (James ii. 16, 26.) Christianity calls us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect.

Have all Christian societies agreed upon the marvellous part of their doctrine? No; this part has produced continual dissensions among Christians, and so long as any individual shall dare to think and to interpret for himself, these must continue. It is this part of Christianity also which has often been the cause, and always served as a pretext, for intolerance, and persecution on account of opinions.

What is to be concluded from this? That every man should be allowed to follow the dictates of his own conscience, and to believe whatever he conceives is true, provided the public tranquillity be not disturbed, and the moral part of Christianity do not suffer.

Is this conclusion reasonable? It is in complete harmony with reason, and in conformity with the moral injunctions of Christianity, which command the preaching of the truth, but strictly prohibit all persecution. 'Go ye,' said Jesus to his disciples, 'into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when you depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet.' The induction is the more reasonable, too, in as much as the Christian doctrine assures us that every one, at the final judgment, will have to render an account of his talents and of his deeds.

In what does Christian morality consist? The whole of it is reducible to two grand commandments, viz. 'Love God with your whole soul,' and 'Love your neighbour as yourself.'—(Matt. xxii. 37, 39.)

What is understood by the 'Love of God?' 'This is the Love of God, that we keep his commandments.' (1 John v. 3.)

Can we, humanly speaking, 'Love God,' such as he is represented in the gospel? Every rational and noble mind must love a God of peace, of goodness, of elemency, and of justice; a God who has compassion on our weaknesses, and who makes the sun to shine, and the rain to descend, even on those who obey not his will; a God who gives the breaker of his law time for repentance; who desires universal happiness; who gives the same laws to the whole human kind indifferently; and who will mercifully judge each by his works, without respect of persons.

Is the observance of certain symbolic forms

sufficient to constitute a Christian? Far from it; though many, indeed, think it is. Forms are not the end of Christianity, they are mere means of engendering and nourishing a Christian spirit.

The Christian morality in commanding love to God, implies in this entire submission to the will of the Creator, does it not? Conviction of the extent and importance of this commandment is of prime necessity. That the will of the Father—God, is to be done on earth as it is done in heaven, is an injunction clearly set forth. The propriety of distinguishing between the laws of God and the enactments of men, is thus proclaimed. Jesus also said, that he could do nothing which he had not seen done by his Father, and he declared that only they who did the will of God were his brothers, sisters, or mother.

Does the will of God comprise the laws of creation, that is to say, the natural laws? Undoubtedly; because God and the Creator are one. Man indeed can create nothing; endowed with understanding to observe phenomena, and the conditions under which they occur, he can however imitate, in some degree, that which the Creator shows him; in other words, he can prepare the conditions necessary to elicit determinate effects; but he is still dependent on the laws of the Creator for the success of his undertakings. Jesus said, 'My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me.' (John vii.)

Is there a difference between the belief in the natural laws and that of Christianity? Those who merely believe in the fixed order of nature admit in the Creator a regard to general good rather than an affection to individuals. They find the natural laws operating with an inflexible tardiness, and never varying to meet the wants of individuals, whilst Christianity represents God as a Father endowed with paternal tenderness towards his offspring, and pardoning the sinner. Further, the belief in the Ordinary Course of Providence does not clearly conceive the reality of a future existence, whilst Christianity promises and assures us of our immortality. Indeed, if man is to live again, he is not to live through any known laws of nature, but by a power higher than nature.

Having seen in an early part of this book, that there are three kinds of natural laws, viz. vegetative, intellectual, and moral laws, which of these is the most important in the view of Christianity?* The knowledge and practice of the moral laws. Jesus says, that his followers are to shine before men, by the light of their good works. (Matt. v.) He placed morality so far above everything else, that some have imagined his aim to have been the annihilation of the physical and intellectual laws of man.

What is the decision of good sense in this particular? It recognises the moral laws as superior to the others; assigns them the direction

of all our actions; introduces harmony among the functions that respectively constitute the moral, the intellectual, and the vegetative laws of man, and it declares that nothing which God has created is ever to be neglected, much less to be annihilated.

Is belief or avowal of belief, in the mission of Jesus, sufficient to constitute a Christian? To be a Christian, it is not enough to recognise Jesus as the Son of God, the Redeemer of Man and the interpreter of the will of his Heavenly Father, or even to be conversant with his commandments; it is indispensably necessary to act upon the precepts he taught. 'He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me.' (John xiv.) 'Not every one who saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but he that doeth the will of my Father.' (Matt. vii.) 'If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love, even as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love.' (John xv.) These are the Master's own words. Paul too says, 'The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power,' i. e. deed. (1 Cor. iv.)

What is the law which, although included under the general title, Love God, Jesus recommended in a particular manner? It is the law of neighbourly love: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,—do unto others as ye would that they did unto you, and do not to others the things ye would not that they did to you.

Is the law of neighbourly love of very extensive application? It is the universal rule of conduct in all the relations of man with his fellow-men. They who practise it will never offend nor injure any one; they will exert their utmost ability to rescind arbitrary and unjust enactments, to crush tyranny, and to abolish slavery of every description; they will not live at the expense of others; they will be meek, indulgent, benevolent, just and faithful; they will never swerve from the path of peace, nor ever lose sight of general happiness as the end of their being.

And to be a Christian it is necessary to practise this law? It is an indispensable condition to be so considered. To say otherwise would either be to deceive ourselves, or to be guilty of hypocrisy. The law is clearly expressed. Jesus frequently admonished his disciples to distinguish themselves by their love of each other.

Is it easy or difficult to accomplish the law of neighbourly love? Jesus announced the law as the will of his heavenly Parent, and he exacts its fulfilment, even though it require the aid of resolution; 'because,' says he, 'no man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.' (Luke ix.) And he adds, 'When we have accomplished all that is commanded, we have done no more than our duty.' He has, however, avowed, that it is extremely difficult to enter into the kingdom of heaven, and that there is

* See page 5.

no perfectly just man in the world. The brethren of Jesus did not believe in him. (John vii. 5.)

Is it equally difficult for all men to be Christians? It is more easy for the poor than for the rich to love their neighbours as themselves. It was especially to the poor that Christ brought the good tidings. He has positively declared that it is extremely difficult for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. (Matt. xix. 23.)

Can we, in the enjoyment of privileges, love our neighbour as ourselves? Good sense replies in the negative.

Are Christians authorised by their doctrine to take or reclaim by force that which others enjoy, in opposition to the law of neighbourly love? By no means; they are forbidden to do evil to any one, or to use violence in any way. They form a class apart, and never serve as instruments in oppressive or exclusionary schemes; among them there is neither master, nor servant, nor slaves; they know but two grades or ranks in their community,—accomplished Christians and disciples, and the accomplished disciple attains the same footing as his teacher; (Luke vi.) they recognise each of their members as possessed of particular gifts, but these all employ agreeably to the law of neighbourly love; each is only answerable for the talents entrusted to his care; and, taking advantage of them in this spirit, all have, as all only require, the same recompense. ‘Christians,’ says Paul to the Romans, ‘form a body and many members; they have different gifts, but each employs that he possesses in union and in charity.’

Is the formation of a Christian society possible? Not among men as they are at present constituted. The law of neighbourly love is sublime, and will remain true to eternity; but it is not as yet given to man to adhere to its injunctions. To do this, the knowledge and practice of the universal law of Christianity, Do the will of God, in all its details, is indispensable; above all, the laws of hereditary descent must be enforced, in order to prepare mankind for the reception of the Christian doctrine in its purity. Without this course, the Holy Spirit will never remain among mankind.

Christianity, in promising everlasting life beyond the grave, does not render temporal happiness incompatible with the prospect of such bliss, does it? To say yes, would be equivalent to saying, that it is necessary to fall sick in order to live well. True, in the actual state of things, the majority of mankind find the task of adherence to the natural laws extremely painful; but this does not prove that the Creator has willed it so, or resolved its endurance for ever. Christianity, in directing the actions of the innate powers, cannot intend to abolish them; and each power, when satisfied, procures pleasure, and some are given only for the sake of temporal happiness.

In what does the worship prescribed by Christianity principally consist? It is reasonable and spiritual, not consisting in what is eaten or drunk, nor in distinctions made between days; (Rom. xiv.) it is a worship which regards the sabbath as made for man, not man for the sabbath; ‘for the Son of man is Lord also of the sabbath;’ (Mark ii. 27.) a worship, according to which the time will come—the time is even now come—when true adorers shall worship God in spirit and in truth; (John iv.) a worship, in fine, which teaches that God is not served by men’s hands, as if *He* had need of aught,—*He* who gives life and sweet consciousness of being to all, and sheds joy and harmony over his creation. (Acts xvii.) The worship, in a word, which the true Christian pays to God, consists in learning and practising his laws in general, and in observing his ordinance of neighbourly love in particular.

Do the religious and moral precepts of the New Testament surpass those of the Old, in perfection and excellence? Whoever will compare the qualities attributed to the Supreme Being, regard the spirit of the laws contained, and observe the means proposed for teaching these, in each, must inevitably recognise the infinite superiority of the doctrines of Christianity.

What is the principal duty of the teachers of religion and morality? To know the universal law of Christianity; to study its particular laws, to spread abroad a knowledge of them, and to show their advantages to individuals, to existing communities, and to posterity; lastly, to attest their own belief, by practising its ordinances. They are to ‘feed the flock of God which is among them, taking the oversight thereof, not by constraint, but willingly, not for filthy lucre, but of a ready mind; neither as being lords over God’s heritage, but being ensamples to his flock.’ (1 Pet. v.) Jesus said pointedly that his disciples were to be known, and true prophets distinguished from false, by their fruits. ‘Beware of false prophets, ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles.’ (Matt. vii.)

What idea do true Christians entertain of Prayer? When they pray they retire into their closet, and when they have shut the door, they pray, above all, that the will of their heavenly Father may be done on earth. (Matt. v.) They ‘use not vain repetitions as the heathen do, who think they shall be heard for their much speaking.’ They are assured that God knows all they require before they present their petition. (Matt. vi.) True Christians do not suppose that they can please the Almighty by any kind of ceremony, by the burning of incense, or otherwise. They admire the Creator in contemplating his works, in meditating on the laws which reign throughout the universe; the further they advance in knowledge, the more do they overflow with rever-

ence and gratitude; examine all their actions, whether or not they be in conformity with morality; they strive to make amends when they have sinned, and they admit in principle that God listens to them in proportion only as they fulfil his laws, in little as well as in great things.

By what visible signs are true Christians, or the disciples of natural morality, distinguished from the rest of mankind? By their works; by their submission to the laws of the Creator in general, and by their practice of the moral laws in particular. 'Ye are my friends,' said Jesus, 'if ye do whatever I command you,' (John xv.) It is in this that ye will be known to be my disciples, if ye have love one for another.'

V. OF CHURCH RELIGION.

What is the meaning of the word church?

1st, It designates a general society of individuals professing the same religious principles. 2d, It also implies any special congregation making part of the general society. Churches are then named from the places at which they exist; as for instance, the church of Corinth, the church of Antioch, of Ephesus, &c. 3d, It is used to designate the government of religious matters. 4th, It signifies the building in which the members of the society or congregation assemble, whether to improve in knowledge of their religious principles, to address prayers to God, to sing hymns to his praise, to return thanks for benefits conferred, generally or particularly, on the members, or to offer adoration in any way whatever.

How is the general Christian church entitled? It is called Catholic.

Are there more Catholic churches than one? Several have at least taken the title. They are distinguished from each other by adding the name of the country or town where they severally commenced, or flourish. Thus there is a Roman catholic church, a Greek catholic church, an Anglican catholic church, and so on.

Can the special societies of the general or catholic churches follow principles differing respectively? It is evident that congregations admitting different principles, do not constitute parts of one catholic church.

Can several churches be catholic in one respect and divided in others? Yes; all which believe in the mission of Jesus and in his miracles, are members of one catholic church, in as far as these points are concerned; but they may be divided into many churches in regard to the precepts admitted as Christian ordinances.

Does the society that changes its religious principles, belong to the catholic church of which it was a part? No; it forms a new church.

Ought there to be superiors in any church? Yes; it is well to have persons especially appointed to teach and to watch over the accomplishment of the principles they admit respectively.

Is any man justified in commanding in the name of God? The power of God is absolute, but if man arrogate such authority, disorder is inevitable. The ministers of religion ought to be responsible to the community for every one of their religious interpretations in the same way as the ministers of civil governments are answerable for their measures.

Can any reliance be placed on the word of him whose actions are at variance with his precepts? No; more especially if the tendency of his teaching be favourable to himself. Jesus said: 'if I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.' (John x. 37.)

What is the common tendency of every established church? The priesthood of every State-religion try to keep religious notions stationary, and to maintain the uniformity of discipline.

Is it possible to keep moral and religious notions stationary? It may be done by Theocratical governments for a shorter or longer period, but it is impossible where civil and religious governments constitute two separate powers. The progress will be slow in proportion as both sorts of governors remain united; but views which are adapted, and even necessary to ignorant generations, cannot satisfy enlightened minds, and must successively improve, as well as arts, sciences, and civil legislation. The technical, obscure and gloomy theology which has come down from times of ignorance, superstition and slavery, must yield to a system which is practical, clear, and calculated to unfold the highest powers of our understanding and our Moral Sentiments.

Is Protestantism compatible with the uniformity of any religious doctrines? No; Protestantism is founded on the right of reasoning, and wherever this is allowed, the uniformity of doctrine cannot last, since the power of reasoning differs in degree in different persons.

Is it wise in the priesthood of established churches to remain stationary whilst the nations improve in civilization? If the Sacerdocy do not keep path in arts and sciences with the community at large, their influence must diminish by degrees, and finally cease altogether.

Since a variety of religious sects is unavoidable wherever the free use of reason is allowed, what should be their common tendency? Each sect should endeavour to establish harmony in all branches of knowledge, physical, intellectual, religious and moral.


Is it possible for any church to become universal and permanent? Yes; that church will become universal and lasting whose religious principles shall be founded on a knowledge of the true nature of man, which shall establish harmony among all the primary faculties of the mind, and which shall elevate religion to the rank of a science. Every religious idea that contravenes reason can only endure for a time.

What then should form the ground-work, and what the aim of that general religious reformation, whose necessity for the well-being of man is so evident? With reason and belief in harmony, knowledge and morality must be its foundation, and the universal happiness its aim. In other words, Christian morality ought to be taught in its purity, and become the essence of religious belief. The practice of the moral law should be a necessary obligation on every mem-

ber of society; whether induced by reason or by faith, by love or by fear, all should be bound to conform to its precepts. No mystical conception, however, ought on any account to be arbitrarily imposed. Every one should be left free to reject or to adopt, according to conscience, any opinion which is not at variance with the true spirit of Christian and natural morality,—which is not inimical to the general peace and happiness.

THE END.

[The issue of Dr. Spurzheim's "PHRENOLOGY IN CONNECTION WITH THE STUDY OF PHYSIOGNOMY" will commence as soon as the Plates are completed, with a Biography of the Author from the Phrenological Journal, which has been kindly placed at the disposal of the Editor by ROBERT COX, Esq., Editor of the Phrenological Journal. This work contains Sixty-eight Portraits.]



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